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Introduction
Recent macroeconomic developments since 2008 have revealed the limits of macroeco-
nomic models that abstract from the essential role of financial markets and the dynamics
of disaggregate heterogeneity in shaping the aggregate economy. In response, a growing
body of research in macroeconomics incorporates credit markets and the frictions they
impose on the economy and emphasizes the links between the macro and micro literature
in explaining causes and effects of observed aggregate time series fluctuations and cross-
sectional variation. Accompanying this shift in perspective, a new set of methodological
tools that could enable the analysis and estimation of this novel class of macroeconomic
models have been gaining importance. Motivated by the research program of this het-
erogeneity agenda, this thesis studies some of the key linkages between aggregate and
disaggregate dynamics in labor and oil markets, with a focus on the role of financial
factors.
Each of the three chapters of the dissertation belongs to one of the main class of questions
that occupy this larger research agenda. The first paper, entitled "Jobless and Wageless
Growth: The Composition Effects of Credit Easing", supports the notion that the state of
the micro-level distribution matters for the transmission of aggregate fluctuations to the
aggregate economy.1 It brings empirics and theory together to explore the role of credit
supply in explaining the jobless and wageless growth patterns observed over the business
cycle in the United States, thereby reflecting on the effectiveness of credit easing policies as
a means to support jobs and real wages growth in post crisis regimes. The paper therefore
targets the policy debate on the expected benefits of continuing to use aggressive credit
expansion in economies where labor markets still show signs of stagnation.
The main takeaway of the paper is that the main thrust of credit easing policies targets
firms that face higher borrowing costs. Such firms are more inclined to use capital instead
of labor in production, because of its collateral value, and pay lower wages because of
1Other examples include work that shows the dependency of monetary policy transmission to aggre-
gate investment and the transmission of credit market disruptions to aggregate TFP on credit worthiness
across the firm distribution (Ottonello and Winberry (2018), Khan and Thomas (2013)).
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the negative impact of higher financing costs on the expected returns on labor. Hence,
by increasing the share of firms with high financing costs in aggregate production, the
composition effects that follow mean that the aggregate labor intensity and the aggregate
real wage fall under negative pressure. The analysis advances the argument that economic
policy aiming at increasing the aggregate labor share may be more effective if measures
that support more equal growth in the full distribution of firms, such as aggregate demand
and productivity stimulants, are adopted.
The second paper, entitled "The balance sheet effects of oil market shocks: an industry
level analysis"2 contributes to the argument that aggregate effects of macroeconomic
shocks can indeed conceal a wider heterogeneity in the pass-through at disaggregated
level. The analysis is motivated by the rapid decline of oil prices in 2015 that was
followed, unexpectedly, by lackluster growth in economic activity and firm profitability.
To investigate this point, the paper studies the pass-through of changes in the oil price
to the balance sheet of US firms, using industry level data covering manufacturing, trade
and mining sectors. It attempts to answer two questions: Are low oil prices good for firm
profits? And through what channels do oil price fluctuations affect firm finances?
Its main conclusion is that the sign and magnitude of the effect of oil prices on the cor-
porate sector depends on two levels of heterogeneity: first, different structural drivers
of oil price changes such as oil demand and supply shocks have different effects; second,
different industries respond differently to the different types of shocks. In addition, it
introduces the novel insight that the real effects of an exogenous disruption in the oil
market does not only depend on its effect on the price of oil; depending on their struc-
tural causes, limited oil prices changes could be associated with large effects on firms.
Furthermore, it argues against the classic notion that the cost share of oil in an industry
determines its level of exposure to oil market shocks.
The last category of questions under the heterogeneity agenda studies the effects of dis-
tributional changes on the aggregate economy. Different from the other two categories,
micro-level distributional changes are taken as a source of aggregate shocks.3 However,
less structural efforts in this area play a large role in shaping contemporary understanding
of the observed gaps in productivity and income across countries and economic sectors.4
2Published in the Journal of Banking and Finance in 2018.
3Being the most difficult to identify and analyze, structural work in this direction is more limited,
focusing so far on the effects on aggregate economic performance of changes in income and wealth distri-
butions across households and credit risk across firms (Chang, Chen, and Schorfheide (2018), Christiano,
Motto, and Rostagno (2014)).
4Misallocation of resources across firms within the sector can for instance explain why agriculture
in China and manufacturing in Mexico are less productive than agriculture and manufacturing in the
United States. We also see that the disproportional allocation of the labor force towards less productive
sectors, such as agriculture, explains the lower aggregate income levels of developing countries.
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To this area belongs the third paper of this dissertation, entitled "The Role of Labor
Market Frictions in Structural Transformation". It studies the large labor productivity
gaps that persist across sectors in many developing economies as a result of stagnant
structural transformation. Against what neo-classical growth models predict, this wedge
between observed and optimal labor allocations suggests the presence of institutional
and market frictions in the reallocation of labor from low to high productivity sectors,
which lead to losses in aggregate labor productivity. The paper quantifies the size of
these frictions and the role of structural reforms in stimulating the process of structural
transformation.
The analysis answers these two points by estimating a dynamic panel error correction
model using a panel of cross-country sector-level data. The model captures the dynamic
adjustment of labor flows across sectors, and provides estimates of the size of the frictions
impeding labor movement, as well as the success of structural reforms in alleviating them.
I argue that policy reforms need to maneuver between the goal of easing job creation and
destruction, while supporting labor incentives to reallocate through stronger social nets,
labor protection and risk sharing.
In addition to its focus on the role of financial factors and micro-level dynamics in macroe-
conomic questions, the second main characteristic of my PhD work has been its reliance on
dynamic structural models. These models aim to identify the effects of exogenous changes
in the variable in question, while pinning down the economic agent’s problem directly
to allow for counter-factual scenarios and predictions. In other words, they model the
unchanging structure and the deep parameters of the agent decision making process, and
the mechanism by which specific surprise events (i.e. innovations) are transmitted to her
optimal decisions. In the papers presented here, I make use of two main types of models:
Heterogeneous agents dynamic equilibrium models and structural vector autoregression
models.
Dynamic stochastic equilibrium models presuppose the economic environment and con-
straints surrounding agents and their optimization problem. Being quite elaborate on
the dynamics and interaction of economic agents, this class of models provides a large
degree of interpretability and allows for a wide range of policy simulations. However, as
the modeled dynamics get richer, these models lose analytical tractability and require
intensive computational efforts. Another shortcoming with typical dynamic equilibrium
models is their struggle when met with the actual data they try to explain; that is,
their more explicit modelling approach comes at the expense of well identified empirical
estimation.
In this respect, structural vector autoregression (SVAR) models maintain an advantage,
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as they allow for tighter empirical estimation of the structural dynamic relations governing
aggregate variables. Moreover, since they estimate the deep structure of the economy,
not only simple correlations, SVAR models preserve the role of expectations in agents’
decisions and are able to produce counter-factual simulations of macroeconomic scenarios.
However, their more agnostic approach, i.e. their reliance on a simpler set of assumptions,
comes at the cost of lesser interpretability and a narrower space for structuring of the
data based on economic theory.
My work on the composition effects of credit easing is one showcase for the use of the two
frameworks in answering a macroeconomic question. The paper analyzes the effects of
aggregate credit easing policies on aggregate labor share. Ex-ante, neither the direction
nor the magnitude nor the specific channels are known. Therefore, the analysis starts
with an empirical assessment of these three unknowns, using an SVAR framework of
the aggregate US economy, with a minimal set of inequality assumptions. The second
part of the paper rationalizes the results and suggests specific channels that can explain
the empirical results, using a dynamic equilibrium model of heterogeneous and financially
constrained firms that uses a full set of assumptions on the economic behaviour of agents.
The SVAR alone does not help us understand why the empirical relation between credit
supply and the labor share are the way they are, and the equilibrium model alone lacks
empirical, i.e. realistic, relevance.
The last element in the composition of my research is data. The papers presented here
use aggregate, sectoral and cross-country variables within both dynamic time series and
panel settings. This variance in data sources is typical of the research agenda this dis-
sertation attempts to contribute to. While the individual papers discuss in details the
data used in their respective empirical and descriptive analyses, one main and common
point stands out and is worth mentioning here; that is, the methodological literature in
econometrics on merging aggregate and disaggregate data, which are typically available at
different frequencies, still lags behind the advancement in the solution and development
of theoretical models.
As a result, there is a gap between the sophisticated predictions of state-of-the-art macroe-
conomic models on the one hand, and the extent to which these predictions can be
supported by empirical evidence on the other. In two of my papers, I circumvent this
challenge by carrying out estimation over multiple stages and aggregation techniques
in order to identify aggregate innovations and match them to the disaggregated data.
Nonetheless, in an ideal world, this type of questions need to be carried out within one
larger system of equations, which is an area of ongoing intensive research.
The work presented here constitutes first steps into the important literature on hetero-
xix
geneity in macroeconomics and finance, and the methodological technologies developed
to analyze the challenges this literature posits. Moving forward, my research agenda aims
at exploring other questions where micro-level dynamics can shed light on the evolution
of the aggregate macroeconomy, while contributing to the methodological literature that
can make this set of questions more accessible. In what follows, I present the three main
papers of my dissertation, ordered in terms of the size of their contribution.
xx INTRODUCTION
Summary
First Chapter The period of jobless and wageless growth that followed the great reces-
sion in the United States raises the question why expansionary credit policies were less
effective for the recovery in employment and real wages in comparison to output. Using a
structural time series analysis of the US credit and labor markets since 1965, I find that,
indeed, credit supply expansions have been associated with a negative impact on the
aggregate labor share. This paper offers one explanation that relies on the composition
effects of credit expansion. I provide evidence that the pass-through of aggregate credit
supply fluctuations to employment growth is stronger for industries that face higher bor-
rowing costs. Firms in these industries prefer collateralizable capital to labor, and pay
lower wages. Consequently, by increasing their share in total output and employment,
the change in composition following an expansion in credit supply exerts negative pres-
sure on the aggregate labor share. I build a dynamic model of heterogeneous firms and
an aggregate financial sector, which accounts for the interaction between financial and
labor market frictions. The model reproduces the negative composition effects of an ag-
gregate credit supply expansion, and reconciles them with the positive within-firm effects
predicted by models that abstract from the role of financial heterogeneity across firms.
The paper, therefore, raises the concern that credit easing may not target firms that have
strong potential to hire or pay high wages.
Second Chapter The paper estimates the dynamic impact of structural oil market
shocks on the balance sheet of US firms, using industry level data covering manufacturing,
trade and mining sectors. For manufacturing firms, findings indicate that an unexpected
disruption in oil supply that raises oil prices by 1% lowers firm profits by 1.3% on impact.
On the other hand, profits rise by 0.39% in response to the same increase in the price
of oil, when it is driven by a positive movement in the global demand for oil, and by
0.79% after an unexpected surge in speculative oil demand. The positive balance sheet
effect of speculative oil shocks on the manufacturing sector contrasts their negative effect
on global economic activity. An explanation follows from the industry level analysis,
which suggests that speculation in the oil market creates a ripple effect in downstream
xxi
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industries and raises inventory demand for petroleum and chemical products. In contrast
to its secondary role in explaining historical variations in the price of oil and profits in
trade and mining sectors, oil supply shocks are found to have been the dominant oil
market innovations in driving fluctuations in manufacturing firms’ profits. The analysis
also finds a limited response of production costs to exogenous changes in the oil price,
disputing the classic notion that the cost share of oil in an industry determines its level
of exposure to oil market shocks.
Third Chapter Large productivity gaps across sectors persist and the process of struc-
tural transformation is stagnant in many developing economies. This wedge between
observed and optimal labor allocations reflects the presence of institutional and mar-
ket frictions, which impose costs on the optimal reallocation of labor from low to high
productivity sectors. Using a panel of cross-country sector-level data, I estimate a dy-
namic panel error correction model that captures the dynamics of sectoral labor flows.
The model estimates provide a new set of stylized facts on the dynamics of the structural
transformation process, and a measure of the magnitude of frictions facing labor flows. In
addition, I analyze the contribution of labor regulations and reforms to the pace at which
labor flows across economic sectors. Results suggest that policy reforms need to steer
between the goal of easing job creation and destruction, while supporting labor supply
incentives to reallocate through strong social nets, labor protection, and risk sharing.
Chapter 1
Jobless and Wageless Growth: The
Composition Effects of Credit Easing
1.1 Introduction
The sharp decline in employment in the US and Europe during the great recession was
followed by a period of near jobless growth as output growth recovered at a faster rate
than growth in employment while growth in real wages stagnated (Calvo, Coricelli, and
Ottonello (2012) and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017)). This pattern of recovery was
associated with post crisis policies that relied mainly on easing the distress in the financial
sector’s balance sheet as means to restore growth in the real economy. Yet, their slower
success with respect to employment and real wages relative to output growth raises the
question: Could expansionary credit policies be partly responsible for the observed jobless
and wageless recovery pattern?
Indeed, using structural time series analysis of credit and labor markets in the United
States, I find that expanding credit supply negatively affects both aggregate labor in-
tensity and the aggregate real wage. Since, these negative effects are the opposite of
what firm-level theory predicts (Petrosky-Nadeau (2014)), this paper suggests an expla-
nation that reconciles the firm level positive labor share effect of credit expansion with
the aggregate negative response I find.
The intuition relies on the composition effects of aggregate credit supply fluctuations
across the firm distribution. I find that the pass-through of aggregate credit supply fluc-
tuations to investment and hiring decisions is stronger for industries that face higher
borrowing costs, which coincides with lower levels of productivity and tangible assets.1
1Ottonello and Winberry (2018) find the opposite pattern for the transmission of monetary policy
1
2 CHAPTER 1. THE COMPOSITION EFFECTS OF CREDIT EASING
Given their higher financing costs, firms in these industries prefer investment in collater-
alizable physical capital to labor (Jermann and Quadrini (2012)). In addition, they pay
a lower wage per worker as their lower productivity and higher cost of financing diminish
the surplus a filled job is expected to create (Michaels, Page, and Whited (2018)).
Therefore, expanding credit supply exerts negative pressure on the aggregate labor share
by increasing the share in total output of firms that have lower labor intensity and pay
lower wages. This novel composition or between channel takes place in parallel to the
within or firm level channel that has typically been explored. I show that this mechanism
is consistent with the empirical findings, as well as a dynamic model of heterogeneous
firms and an aggregate financial sector, where the degree of financing costs vary across
firms, while labor and financial markets frictions give rise to heterogeneous wages across
the firm distribution.2
This argument rests on three complementary steps. I start by constructing an instrument
of exogenous fluctuations in aggregate credit supply (i.e. structural credit supply shocks),
estimated within a structural vector autoregression model (SVAR) of the joint dynamics
of US output, labor, and credit markets. I introduce a novel narrative approach to the
identification of credit supply shocks, implemented within a Bayesian sign restrictions
framework (Kilian and Murphy (2014), Antolin-Diaz and Rubio Ramírez (2018)).3 This
identification approach ensures that the constructed instrument moves in the tightening
direction during the key historical financial distress events that caused a balance sheet
damage to the financial sector, limiting its risk appetite and ability to extend credit.
I find that credit expansion has positive persistent effects on aggregate output and em-
ployment levels, in contrast to its negative effect on aggregate labor intensity and the
average real wage.4 Decomposing the changes in aggregate labor intensity and the aggre-
gate wage into within and between (i.e. composition) components, the negative aggregate
responses could be a result of either: 1) a decline in labor intensity and compensations
for all individual firms (i.e. the within channel), or 2) an increase in the share of firms
that have lower labor intensity and pay lower wages (i.e. the composition channel).5
shocks. The reason is that monetary policy shocks affect the risk free rate in the economy, while our
shock affects only the borrowing spread. The model I present in the second half of the paper makes this
point clearer.
2The analysis focuses on the relation between credit supply and firm borrowing constraints. Credit
supply can also affect firms through its effects on aggregate consumption, especially household spending,
see Mian and Sufi (2014). Accounting for these effects affects neither the empirical results nor the main
intuition of the paper.
3Kilian and Murphy (2014) and Antolin-Diaz and Rubio Ramírez (2018) use the narrative approach
to identify oil market and monetary policy structural shocks, respectively.
4The negative effects on labor intensity are in the short run in contrast to the effect on the aggregate
real wage which is persistent.
5The response of inflation under nominal wage rigidity could be another reason that lies outside the
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However, the first channel goes against the documented empirical evidence, which points
out that a healthier credit supply is associated with strong firm level employment effects
(e.g. Chodorow-Reich (2014)), and lower borrowing costs are associated with higher firm
level labor compensation (e.g. Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz-Molina (2009), Matsa (2010),
Benmelech, Bergman, and Enriquez (2012), Michaels, Page, and Whited (2018)).
In the second part of the paper, I examine the second channel, exploring the dimensions
over which the composition of the firm/industry cross-section changes in reaction to
exogenous shifts in credit supply. Specifically, I look at whether the exposure of a firm to
credit market fluctuations correlates positively with the effective relative price of labor
that it faces (i.e. its propensity to prefer capital investment over hiring), and negatively
with the labor wage it pays (i.e. expected labor productivity). If these two correlations are
supported by the data, then we could expect expansionary movements in credit markets
to result in output growth that is supported more by capital investment and less by
hiring, and that creates jobs that pay lower wages than the aggregate wage.
To answer this point, I use the SVAR implied time series of exogenous movements in
aggregate credit supply along with a long quarterly panel that matches US industry level
data for employment, wages, job flows (openings, expansions, closings and contractions),
and balance sheet variables. For the relative price of labor, I use financing costs as proxy;
since firms rely on liquidity (i.e. cash holdings or working capital) to finance their labor
stock before production is complete (Calvo, Coricelli, and Ottonello (2012), Jermann and
Quadrini (2012), Bacchetta, Benhima, and Poilly (2015)), higher financing costs make
labor relatively more expensive compared to capital; capital is its own collateral while
labor carries no collateral value.
I find that in reaction to credit supply expansion, industries that face higher borrowing
costs, and pay lower wages will hire and retain more workers; furthermore, the decline
in aggregate real wage is even stronger in industries that hire and retain more workers.
Across job flows, the positive employment effect appears to be driven more by the decline
in job contractions and closings, in contrast to a weaker and less statistically significant
response of job creation.6 Putting them together, these results suggest that the compo-
sition effects could explain how credit expansion may give rise to a pattern of jobless and
wageless growth, when the negative effects of the between channel dampen aggregate
labor market growth.7 They also confirm a significant role of borrowing and liquidity
scope of this paper; see Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2017).
6This result argues against propositions that restricting credit supply reduces employment mainly
by constraining the number of new jobs (Mehrotra and Sergeyev (2016)). It also raises concerns on
approaches that model financial shocks as shocks to continuation or entry costs (e.g. Khan and Thomas
(2013))
7The result with regards to job flows is also in line with this conclusion; given that contracting and
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constraints in the propagation of financial sector disruptions.8
The third and last part of the paper connects the empirical results in a theoretical frame-
work that rationalizes and reproduces both the within and between effects. Specifically,
it explains why credit expansion could contribute to a wider gap between aggregate(i.e.
average) investment and hiring rates, while exerting negative pressure on the aggregate
real wage. I build a dynamic equilibrium model of heterogeneous firms and a banking
sector with endogenous default, where both types of agents are financially constrained
and subject to balance sheet shocks that affect their borrowing costs (Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), Hirakata,
Sudo, and Ueda (2017)).
The second ingredient to the model is that labor wages must be paid before returns
from production are realized. This payment schedule creates dependency between wages
and today’s available funds, thus implying that the expected return on an extra worker
correlates with the cost of external financing used to hire her; that is, financing costs
change the relative prices of labor and capital, making the latter cheaper for firms facing
higher borrowing costs (Jermann and Quadrini (2012) and Calvo, Coricelli, and Ottonello
(2012)). In addition, I introduce labor market frictions and make wage setting endogenous
at the firm level, which gives rise to a distribution of heterogeneous wages across firms.
Over this distribution, firms with higher financing costs and credit risk pay lower wages
to their labor stock (Quadrini (2011), Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) and Michaels, Page, and
Whited (2018)). These three ingredients could explain how a positive shock that arises
in the financial sector balance sheet could bring about jobless and wageless growth as a
result of composition effects.
Related literature The paper contributes to both the empirical and theoretical lit-
erature on the interaction between labor and credit markets. In addition to being the
first to highlight the negative effects of credit expansion on aggregate labor share, it is
to my knowledge the first detailed aggregate time series study of the effects of financial
sector fluctuations on the labor market. Hristov, Hülsewig, and Wollmershäuser (2012),
Eickmeier and Ng (2015), and Gambetti and Musso (2017) estimate the time series effects
of financial shocks within an SVAR framework as well; yet, their focus is not on labor
market responses and they do not explore the transmission and disaggregate dynamics.
With respect to identification, the analysis is the first to bring the narrative approach to
exiting firms are typically more financially constrained, less liquid and less productive, the jobs they
retain, as they survive on credit supply expansion, are low productivity jobs.
8The result complements Mian and Sufi (2014) who find no significant evidence that borrowing con-
straints played a role in the 2008 decline in employment.
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the study of the causal effects of aggregate financial sector fluctuations; see Kilian and
Murphy (2014) and Antolin-Diaz and Rubio Ramírez (2018) for applications in identifying
structural oil market and monetary policy shocks.
Moreover, by incorporating the information available over the time dimension, the paper
complements studies that rely on single events to study the causal link between credit
supply and labor markets (e.g. Chodorow-Reich (2014), Mian and Sufi (2014)). Estimates
from the SVAR model also provide a more agnostic benchmark (Canova and Sala (2009))
for DSGE models that fit aggregate data to study similar questions, (e.g. Jermann and
Quadrini (2012), Zanetti (2015), and Mehrotra and Sergeyev (2016)).
On the other hand, the novel contribution of the theoretical framework presented here ver-
sus Michelacci and Quadrini (2005), Quadrini (2011), Petrosky-Nadeau (2014) Quadrini
and Sun (2015) and Michaels, Page, and Whited (2018) is to show the aggregate labor
market implications of the interaction between labor and financial frictions across the
firms distribution, when a turbulent financial sector is introduced; more specifically, the
analysis here is the first to analyze the composition effects that are brought about by the
heterogeneous impact of credit supply disruptions across the firm distribution.
More generally, the paper also contributes to the evolving literature on heterogeneity in
firm growth and response to aggregate fluctuations (e.g. Davis and Haltiwanger (2001),
Mitra (2018), Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda (2013), Ottonello and Winberry (2018)).
Outline The paper proceeds as follows. Section two discusses the empirical framework
and results for the aggregate and disaggregate estimations. Section three presents the
theoretical framework and discusses its dynamics and simulations. Section four concludes.
1.2 Empirical Framework
The first goal of the paper is to construct a measure of exogenous credit supply fluctua-
tions and quantify the magnitude of their causal effects on the labor market. However,
because aggregate variables such as loan volume, interest rates and bond spreads are
jointly driven by shifts in credit supply and demand factors, these variables share both
simultaneous and dynamic dependencies; thus, an instrument is needed in order to iden-
tify exogenous fluctuations in credit supply.
An SVAR model can account for such common dependencies over a long number of lags to
distinguish between expected and unexpected components in the time series of aggregate
variables. Moreover, by incorporating elements from economic theory to impose plausible
economic assumptions on the effects of an exogenous change in credit supply, the model
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can break down the unexpected component to the independent time series of credit supply
and demand shifters. That is, the SVAR implied series of exogenous fluctuations in credit
supply is orthogonal to other structural drivers in the economy that affect demand for
credit, including consumption, technology and monetary policy fluctuations.9
In addition, examining causal relations within an SVAR model has an advantage over
other empirical strategies as it uses all available time series information without imposing
restrictions on the dynamic dependency of the endogenous variables. It is also relatively
simpler with respect to the assumptions it imposes on the structure of the data generating
process and parameters priors compared to large equilibrium macro models (Canova and
Sala (2009)).
Nonetheless, despite the advantages of the SVAR models, its ability to explain the trans-
mission dynamics is limited. I overcome this concern, in the second part of the empirical
analysis, by feeding the SVAR implied time series of credit supply shocks into a series of
panel estimations (Kilian (2009), see also Buetzer, Habib, and Stracca (2012) and Herrera
and Rangaraju (2018)). These second stage estimations explore the interaction between
aggregate shocks and the cross-section of industry level wages and job flows.
1.2.1 An SVAR model of US credit, output and labor markets
Variables description and specification
The structural process governing US credit, output and labor markets dynamic interac-
tion is assumed to follow a linear structural vector autoregression model. Yt is a vector
of ten quarterly endogenous variables that describe the three markets: 1) real business
and commercial loans volume (log-level); 2) the BAA spread over the 10 years treasury
bond (level); 3) long term interest rate, proxied by the 10-Year treasury constant matu-
rity rate (level); 4) real GDP (log-level); 5) quarterly inflation (level); 6) fixed private
investment, net of depreciation (log-level); 7) capacity utilization (level); 8) total US
non-farm employees (log-level); 9) private average weekly hours of production and non-
supervisory employees (log-level); 10) private average hourly earnings of production and
non-supervisory jobs (log-level). The sample period is 1965:Q1 - 2019:Q1.10
The choice of credit market variables is motivated by the sign restrictions identification
strategy to distinguish between demand and supply shocks. Therefore, I include a quan-
tity variable (credit volume) and a price variable (bond spread). In addition, I include
9In that sense, the measure I use here is different from other financial distress indices (e.g. Gilchrist
and Zakrajšek (2012))
10The results remain robust to using the sub-sample 1984:Q1 - 2008:Q2.
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the interest rate to distinguish between credit supply and other interest rate shocks (e.g.
shocks to monetary policy and the exchange rate); expansionary credit supply and in-
terest rate shocks shift the credit supply curve in the same direction, but have opposite
effects on the interest rate. The second block of variables constitutes an aggregate pro-
duction function, whereby output is a function of labor and capital, over their intensive
and extensive margins (capacity utilization and average hours).




AiYt−i + t (1.1)
where all variables are allowed to have dynamic interdependency up to 1 years (4 quar-
ters lags) and a constant term is included but suppressed for notational convenience.
The number of lags is chosen to make the model specification compatible to standard
aggregate SVAR models.11. A0 and Ai describe the contemporaneous and dynamic rela-
tions, respectively, between the system variables. t is a vector of structural shocks with
a diagonal covariance matrix Ω. I estimate this quarterly 10-D SVAR(4) model within a
Bayesian framework, with diffuse Normal-inverse Wishart priors.12
Identification by sign restrictions
Sign restrictions are a natural candidate for the identification of supply shocks; by impos-
ing simple prior inequality constraints on the impulse responses of quantities (i.e. loan
volume in our application) and prices (i.e. bond spreads), we can differentiate between
the effects of exogenous supply and demand shifters in the credit market: a tightening
credit supply is expected a priori to lower credit volume and raise bond spreads, while a
contraction in credit demand lowers both spread and quantity.
The model is partially identified, meaning that, in addition to credit supply shocks, I
identify a single generic credit demand shock. Although we are only interested in the
role of the credit supply shocks, as Canova and Paustian (2011) and Kilian and Murphy
(2012) discuss, it is still important to impose all available prior economic knowledge,
even on the other structural shocks. Adding this extra structure shrinks the uncertainty
around the estimates; see Kilian and Lütkepohl (2017) for a detailed discussion of the
11Statistical information criteria suggest a lower number of lags. The main results remain unchanged
when using 2 or 8 lags
12This choice of priors minimizes the effect of the inclusion of subjective information on the posterior
estimates. In addition, since output, labor, and credit markets are highly entangled with potentially
sticky dynamics, I opt not to use a Minnesota (Litterman) prior, which imposes prior assumptions on
the dynamic and cross relations between the variables that may not be well founded in this context.
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sign restrictions approach.
With respect to the form of sign restrictions I apply, in addition to imposing impact in-
equality restrictions, similar to Hristov, Hülsewig, and Wollmershäuser (2012), Eickmeier
and Ng (2015), and Gambetti and Musso (2017), I introduce novel narrative restrictions.
These restrictions ensure that the constructed series for credit supply and demand shocks
moves in the tightening direction during the key historical financial distress events that
caused a balance sheet damage to lenders and borrowers, limiting their risk appetite and
risk bearing capacity. The narrative approach plays a large role in the monetary and
fiscal policy literature (e.g. Romer and Romer (1989), Romer and Romer (2004), Ramey
(2011)), and was introduced into the sign restrictions framework by Kilian and Murphy
(2014) and by Antolin-Diaz and Rubio Ramírez (2018) for an application in the oil mar-
ket and Zeev (2018) in the identification of news shocks. This paper is the first to use it
in the context of identifying credit market shocks.
Impact restrictions
Table 1.1 summarizes the sign restrictions imposed on impact. An expansionary credit
supply shock is defined as aggregate exogenous change that lowers bond spreads and
stimulates both loan volume and economic activity, triggering an increase in both inflation
and the real interest rate.13 The response of real wages is ambiguous because of two
competing forces: on the one hand, the rise in labor demand exerts upward pressure on
labor compensations and, on the other hand, the higher inflation after the shock pushes
real wages down.
The second column refers to the impact restrictions of positive credit demand shocks.
Demand shocks in the credit market are any exogenous aggregate fluctuations that drive
an increase in demand for credit. These aggregate innovations include aggregate demand
and investment opportunities shocks as well as transitory aggregate supply shocks that
may opt producers to smooth their returns by borrowing. Therefore, we only impose the
prior knowledge with regards to the impact of these shocks as demand shifters in the
credit market.
Narrative restrictions
Large financial losses, which follow unexpected bankruptcy events or market valuation
disturbances, cause balance sheet (i.e. net worth) distress at both the firm as well as
the financial sector sides. As a result, credit markets experience a deterioration of the
risk-bearing capacity and risk appetite of both lenders and borrowers, which discourages
13see Gambetti and Musso (2017) for a summary of the responses predicted by a set of standard
macro-finance DSGE models.
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Table 1.1: SVAR impact sign restrictions
Pos. credit supply shock Pos. credit demand shock
Real loan volume + +
Bond spread − +
Real long-term interest rate + Unrestricted
Real GDP + Unrestricted
Inflation + Unrestricted
Real fixed investment + Unrestricted
Utilization + Unrestricted
N. Employees + Unrestricted
Average weekly hours + Unrestricted
Real average wage Unrestricted Unrestricted
both demand and supply of credit (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999), Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2010), Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012)). Over the time period of the sample,
such unexpected events could be interpreted as exogenous credit supply and demand
shifters and, therefore, should map to the shock series we aim to identify. In other words,
these historical events provide additional prior information that takes the form of negative
restrictions on the identified time series of credit supply and demand shocks at the points
in time the events took place.
The identifying events need to have had an unexpected component, caused balance sheet
damage to the aggregate financial and non-financial sector in the US, and not been
accompanied by other unexpected events that had stronger and opposite effects. I apply
this intuition to a total of five unexpected stock and credit market crashes, during which
the balance sheet of the financial and corporate sectors must have incurred some damage
due to actual losses in assets, losses in market valuation of asset holdings, decline in
returns (due to weaker demand), or simply confidence losses.
1. August 2015: the global stock market sell-off (Chinese Black Monday) caused major
losses in Western and Asian financial markets. The Dow Jones index fell by 7.6%
between August 18th and 21st, while the Shanghai composite loss was over 15 %. In
addition, oil prices fell by 16% during this month and many Asian currencies had
to significantly depreciate.
2. September 2008: Lehman Brothers collapsed with asset holdings over 600 billion
USD; it was the largest bankruptcy in US history, triggering the financial crisis and
the great recession.
3. September 2001: the US experienced its most violent terrorist attacks, which caused
widespread turbulence in financial markets and 40 billion USD in insurance losses.
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Figure 1.1: Quarterly time series of aggregate credit supply shocks
The plots present the identified quarterly aggregate credit supply shocks, using the modal model esti-
mates, see Inoue and Kilian (2013). The modal model estimate of the time series of credit supply shocks
is highly correlated with the rest of the models in the admissible set: For a total of 305 admissible models,
the distribution of correlation values has the following characteristics: 1st quartile: 0.73; median:0.78;
mean: 0.75; 3rd quartile: 0.82.
In addition, the Dow Jones index fell by 7.13 % in reaction once trading resumed.
4. April 2000: the Dot Com bubble imploded, causing around 1.755 trillion USD losses
in market value.
5. October 1987: the Black Monday crash caused Dow Jones to fall by 22.6%.
These dates specify an additional set of filters that I impose on the set of admissible
models identified by impact sign restrictions. For each of these models (i.e. for every
admissible set of Ai and Σ matrices), the narrative restrictions algorithm works by com-
puting the implied time series of the credit supply shocks associated with it, and filtering
out models that do not yield negative shocks on these specific dates.14
1.2.2 Discussion: Aggregate effects
Figure 1.1 plots the time series of the identified quarterly credit supply shock (using the
modal model estimates, see Inoue and Kilian (2013)) and figure 1.2 reports the impulse
response functions to an unexpected easing in credit supply. The responses reflect an
expansionary effect, where a shock of the magnitude that lowers bond spreads by one
standard deviation (0.72%) on impact, leads to an increase in real GDP and number of
employees, peak at about 1% above their pre-shock levels. However, the average real
wage declines to a trough of -1.6%. Fixed investment shows the highest sensitivity to
credit supply fluctuations with a peak effect reaching 17%. The response to the shock
takes place at the intensive margin as well. Both capacity utilization and the average
weekly hours rise, peaking at around 1.5% and 0.45%, respectively.
14The narrative restrictions help shrink the uncertainty of the estimates; as a robustness test, I estimate
the model with only the events of 2008 Lehman crash and 2001 attacks; the estimates are more uncertain
but are qualitatively the same.
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Figure 1.2: Structural impulse responses to an expansionary credit supply shock
The plots present the modal model (thick black line) and models in the 68% joint regions of highest
posterior density (blue hairlines), see Inoue and Kilian (2013). The red dashed lines are estimates of the
68% point-wise posterior credible sets. The shock is scaled to produce one standard deviation decline
in the bond spread on impact. Responses of bond spread and utilization represent differences in levels,
where the levels of the two variables are in percent. The remaining responses of the first two rows are
differences in log-levels (i.e percentage differences). Jobs-output ratio response is the difference between
the responses of n. employees and GDP. Hours-output ratio is the difference between the response of
total hours, defined as the sum of n. employees and avg. hours responses, and the response of GDP. The
response of the labor share is the sum of total hours and average wage responses minus the response of
GDP.
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More interestingly, comparing the responses of employment, average hours and the av-
erage wage to output reveals a negative impact on the aggregate labor share, which is
more intensified in the short-run. This decline in the labor share is driven primarily by
a decline in the average wage as well as a short-run decline in labor intensity in produc-
tion (labor to output ratio). Hence, the results are consistent with the initial hypothesis
laid out: credit supply expansion contributes to the jobless and wageless growth pattern
observed over the business cycle in aggregate output and labor markets.
These results are particularly interesting because they go against the firm level empirical
and theoretical reasoning, which predicts that lowering financing costs should result in
1) higher demand for labor, as the effective relative price of labor declines (Jermann and
Quadrini (2012), Calvo, Coricelli, and Ottonello (2012)), and 2) an increase in wages, as
the expected surplus workers create increases (Michelacci and Quadrini (2005), Michaels,
Page, and Whited (2018)). On the other hand, since it is not clear why the indirect
aggregate demand effects of expanding aggregate credit supply could affect the relative
price of factors of production, these demand effects cannot explain the negative response
of the labor share.
The next section explores the composition effects over the cross section of firms, in order to
reconcile the result of negative aggregate labor share effect with the evidence on positive
firm-level effect. That is, it tries to answer the question: even though credit supply
stimulates employment and wages at the firm level, could the composition of the firm
distribution change such that aggregate employment and wage growth is subdued?
1.2.3 Inspecting the mechanism: Disaggregate effects
The composition effects of aggregate credit supply fluctuations
This part of the analysis aims to explore the dimensions over which the composition of
the firm distribution changes in reaction to exogenous shifts in credit supply. Since the
aggregate labor intensity and aggregate wage are simply the weighted averages of their
respective values at individual firms or industries i, composition effects can be important
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if heterogeneity in the cross sectional effects is not random. Formally,
Aggregate Labor Intensity =
∑
i











and the change in aggregate labor intensity in reaction to an aggregate credit supply
shock can be decomposed into,
∆Aggregate Labor Intensity =
within effect (+)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i
w0i ×∆LIi +
composition effect (−)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i
∆wi × LI0i +





within effect (+)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i
w0i ×∆Wagei +
composition effect (−)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i
∆wi ×Wage0i +
interaction (+)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i
∆wi ×∆Wagei (1.7)
where w0i and LI0i are the shares and firm labor intensity prior to an exogenous increase
in credit supply, respectively. The decomposition breaks the change in aggregate labor
intensity to within, and cross firms (or industries) changes as well as an interaction term.
Corollary 1 in section 1.3.3 below discusses this decomposition in details and explains the
motivation behind the suggested signs in light of the theoretical model. For our purposes
at this empirical stage of the analysis, it suffices to point out that our interest in the rest
of the empirical part of the paper lies in analyzing the composition effects embodied in
the second term.
That is, we are interested in examining whether the effect of movements in credit supply,
on a firm or an industry share in total output, ∆wi, correlates negatively with its individ-
ual labor intensity,LI0i , and wage, Wage0i . More specifically, in what follows I explore the
correlation between a firm’s propensity to grow in reaction to credit supply expansion,
on the one hand, and the effective relative price of labor it faces and the labor wage it
pays, on the other hand. If these two correlations are supported by the data, then we
could expect the effect of expansionary movements in credit markets on output growth
to be stronger than their effects on growth in the aggregate labor intensity and wage, due
to the negative influence of the composition term.
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A panel of industry level employment, job flows, wages, and balance sheet
variables
To explore the composition effects and the transmission mechanisms of credit supply
shocks to labor markets, I construct a panel of US quarterly job flows, employment,
wages, and balance sheet variables at the 3-digit NAIC industry level. For employment
and wages, I use the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages (QCEW) database.
QCEW is reported by employers and covers more than 95 percent of US jobs. For job
flows, I use the Business Employment Dynamics (BED) database from the Bureau of
Labor and Statistics. The data is generated from the Quarterly Census of Employment
and Wages program and provides estimates of job flows by type (openings, expansion,
closings and contractions).
Finally, for the balance sheet variables, I use the Quarterly Financial Report (QFR) from
the US Census Bureau. It is a quarterly survey that covers around 10,000 US firms
and presents estimated statements of earnings, balance sheets, and related financial and
operating variables for manufacturing, services, and trade firms.
The purpose of the panel is to explore the disaggregate effects of the financial sector
shocks across industries and job flows, while using industry level interaction terms to find
out the determinants of the heterogeneity observed across these disaggregate effects. I
run the estimations that do not require balance sheet variables on the larger QCEW and
BED samples, which extends over the 1992:Q3-2017:Q3 period with 98 time observations
for 86 industries. Due to the narrower coverage of the QFR, when balance sheet data
enters the econometric specification, the sample becomes unbalanced and shrinks to the
period 2000:Q4-2017:Q3, covering 25 industries. Table 1.2 reports summary statistics for
the panel variables used in the analysis.
Heterogeneity across sectors
Before testing the dynamics that determine the composition effects suggested by the
paper, I start by exploring the degree of dispersion across economic sectors with respect
to their responses to aggregate credit supply shocks. I estimate the following simple
regressions, where the LHS are net job flows and average real wages for industry i within
sector j at time t. Sectors are determined based on the first 2-digit of an industry NAIC
classification. Net job flows are the difference between gross job gains and losses, while
average wages are computed as the total wage bill divided by total number of employees
each quarter.
On the RHS, CreditSupplyt is the time series of SVAR implied credit supply shocks (using
the modal model estimates, see Inoue and Kilian (2013)), normalized by its standard
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Table 1.2: Summary statistics of the disaggregate industry-level panel
Variable Min. 1st Quart. Median Mean 3rd Quart. Max. Std.
Net job flows (thous.) -343.292 -2.051 0.975 3.739 7.470 261.957 21.820
Gross job losses (thous.) 0.622 16.397 44.548 84.233 97.986 945.617 128.353
Gross job gains (thous.) 0.802 16.332 45.212 87.971 101.638 937.036 136.870
Closings (thous.) 0.060 2.442 7.328 16.502 18.034 224.562 28.213
Contraction (thous.) 0.146 13.798 35.725 67.731 78.029 803.090 101.458
Expansions (thous.) 0.147 13.736 36.944 70.244 81.008 776.692 105.473
Openings (thous.) 0.089 2.248 7.236 17.727 18.657 264.859 33.084
Avg. wage 716.7 2223.2 3222.9 3753.6 4594 30030.3 2357.21
Fixed assets 0.119 0.293 0.504 0.489 0.646 1.011 0.217
Total liabilities 0.330 0.509 0.587 0.579 0.646 0.811 0.091
Current liabilities 0.063 0.167 0.209 0.207 0.246 0.337 0.051
Sales 0.075 0.153 0.242 0.262 0.328 0.761 0.136
Operational income -0.013 0.013 0.019 0.019 0.023 0.044 0.008
The table reports summary statistics of industry level data used in the disaggregate analysis, as described
in section (1.2.3). Non-balance sheet data are based on QCEW and BLS panels and cover 86 3-digit
NAICs industries and 98 quarterly time observations over 1992:Q3-2017:Q3. The series for gross job
flows are plotted in figure 1.3. Balance sheet data are based on the QFR unbalanced panel and covers 25
industries over the 2000:Q4-2017:Q3. Average real wage is in levels (wage bill/employment). All balance
sheet variables are ratios over total assets.
deviation; figure 1.1 plots the series prior to normalization. SIC sectorj is a dummy for
the respective sector; ηi is the industry fixed effect,
Net Job Flowsi,j,t =
β1Net Job Flowsi,j,t−1 + β2CreditSupplyt + β3{SIC sectorj × CreditSupplyt }+ ui,j,t (1.8)
Avg. real wagesi,j,t =
β1Avg. real wagesi,j,t−1 + β2
CreditSupply
t + β3{SIC sectorj × CreditSupplyt }+ ui,j,t (1.9)
The findings in table 1.3 reveal a wide dispersion in the magnitude of sectors reaction
to credit supply shocks, with respect to both net job flows and average real wages. The
job flows result falls in line with our hypothesized intuition and indicates that credit
easing policies alter the relative shares of employment across sectors by supporting job
creation/retention in different sectors with different degrees.
Similarly, table 1.3 reveals that the negative response of average wages also takes place
at the disaggregate level. Within the composition hypothesis, these negative signs imply
that the composition effects do not only take place across industries, but also within
industries at the firm level. In this respect, the significant sector dummies with regards to
the average wage responses indicate that credit market conditions affect the distribution
of jobs within sectors by varying degrees. This distinction between cross and within
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effects based on job flows and wage responses will prove to be useful for the subsequent
discussion. Next, I move to test the empirical relevance of the two correlation patterns,
discussed earlier, which are required to explain the potential causal link between credit
expansion and jobless/wageless growth.
Financial heterogeneity and the transmission of the aggregate shock
Borrowing costs are one proxy of the relative price of labor, which we could also expect
to be a determinant of the pass-through of credit supply movements across firms; since
firms rely on liquidity (i.e. cash holdings or working capital) to finance their labor
stock before production is complete (Calvo, Coricelli, and Ottonello (2012), Jermann
and Quadrini (2012), Bacchetta, Benhima, and Poilly (2015)), higher financing costs
make labor relatively more expensive compared to capital; this is because the latter is its
own collateral while labor carries no collateral value.
To proxy for the level of financing costs an industry faces, I use the ratio of total cur-
rent liabilities to total assets, which captures the interest expenses and other short term
obligations (with maturity less than one year) firms have to pay within an industry.
Therefore, between two industries that are similar in their degree of long term solvency,
revenues, proftitability and size, the level of current liabilities provides a measure of how
financially risky an industry is from the lenders’ perspective and how dependent it is on
liquidity in the financial sector. I estimate the following specification for industry i at
time t.
Net job flowsi,t =
β1Net job flowsi,t−s−1 + β2
CreditSupply
t−s × log{Current liabilities}i,t−s−1+
β3 log{Current liabilities}i,t−s−1 + β4CreditSupplyt−s +
βZi,t−s−1 + ui,t (1.10)
Zi,t ≡ { log{Avg. real wages}; log{Sales}; log{Operational income}; log{Total liabilities};
log{Fixed assets}; log{Total assets }; log{N. employees } }
Importantly, CreditSupplyt is exogenous to net job flows (LHS), not serially correlated,
and orthogonal to other aggregate shocks, which saves us the need to control for other
dynamics, aggregate variables, or time fixed effects. Table 1.4 reports the results for the
estimation of equation (1.10) for different lag values s, using industry fixed effects and
both industry and time fixed effects.
I find an important role for the degree of borrowing constraints in the transmission of
aggregate credit supply disruptions, CreditSupplyt−s × log(CurrLiab)i,t−s−1; the higher is the
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value of current liabilities assets of an industry, the larger is employment growth in
response to credit supply shocks: between two similar industries that differ by 1% in
their current liabilities, net job flows of the more liable industry are 4165.65 jobs higher
in reaction to one standard deviation positive expansion in credit supply. These findings,
which supplement Mian and Sufi (2014) findings, suggest that output growth in periods
of credit expansion is more likely to be jobless since it is disproportionately more driven
by firms that face higher financing costs; these firms value physical capital more than
labor and are more likely to have a lower labor intensity in production.
Does heterogeneity in labor productivity matter? The second correlation we
need to examine in order to verify the composition mechanism suggested by the paper is
between the level of labor productivity within an industry and its propensity to hire or
retain workers in response to credit expansion. I estimate the following specification,
Net job flowsi,t = β1Net job flowsi,t−s−1+
β2
CreditSupply
t−s × log{Avg. real wages}i,t−s−1+
β3 log{Avg. real wages}i,t−s−1 + β4CreditSupplyt−s + ui,t (1.11)
The average real wage is the deflated total quarterly wage bill divided by the total number
of employees for industry i at time t. Table 1.5 reports the estimation results; our interest
is in β2 of the interaction term between exogenous aggregate credit supply movements
and average labor productivity at the industry level. The figures indicate that industries
paying higher average real wages, hire considerably less in response to an exogenous
easing in credit supply: between two industries that differ in their average real wage by
1%, the net job flows of the higher pay industry is 976.53 jobs less in response to one
standard deviation positive shock to aggregate credit supply. Thus, by increasing the
number of workers employed in industries or firms that pay lower than the mean wage,
credit expansion could exert a negative pressure on the aggregate average wage, despite
the rise in output (i.e. wageless growth).
Heterogeneity across job flows Next, I examine whether there is an asymmetry
in the respective roles of job creation and destruction in accounting for the dynamic
adjustment of employment to credit supply disruptions. The purpose of the exercise is
to see whether the rise in net job flows is a result of new jobs being created or old jobs
being retained, which could shed light on the type of firms that are most affected. Job
creating firms are typically in a growth state, meaning that they are less likely to be
facing high financing costs, compared to firms that retain old jobs, but do not necessarily
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Figure 1.3: Job flows in levels by type, from the Business Employment Dynamics dataset.
create new ones. In addition, created jobs have more competitive wages that reflect in
part the aggregate economic outlook of the labor market. The mechanism suggested by
the paper would predict the magnitude of credit expansion effect on job creating firms
to be smaller than its effect on job destroying firms, because the latter is more likely to
be facing higher financing costs. If that is indeed the case, then it also follows that we
should expect credit expansion not to be very effective in raising aggregate wages.
Figure 1.3 plots US job flows by type over the intensive and extensive margins of firm
distribution (expansion, contraction, openings and closings). Two relevant observations
stand out: First, the extensive margin of job flows matters: out of the 8.613 million jobs
destroyed in the first quarter of 2009, 1.5 million jobs (17.4 %) were lost by exiting firms.
Second, between 2009 and 2010, the number of jobs lost due to firm contractions declined
at a faster rate than the number of job expansions. By the third quarter of 2009, gross
job destruction rebounded to a lower level than 2007 and continued to decline to reach
its lowest level over the 1992-2017 period in the first quarter of 2012. This fast rebound
is in contrast to the slow recovery of job gains that did not reach its pre-crisis level until
2015. That is, the slow recovery of employment after the crisis was driven primarily by
the slow growth of the number of expanding firms.
Given that quantitative easing has been the main policy tool in most of the post cri-
sis regime, the figures suggest that credit expansion may actually be more effective at
lowering job destruction in comparison to its ability to encourage job creation. To for-
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malize this point, I regress the seven time series of aggregate job flows (net flows, gross
gains, gross losses, closings, contractions, openings and expansions) on the time series of
aggregate credit supply shocks in seven individual regressions,





t−s + ut (1.12)
The left hand side variable is the log of job flows. For net job flows, I do not use the logged
variable since the time series crosses the zero line over a few episodes in the sample. Since
the SVAR estimation delivers an instrument that is exogenous and orthogonal to other
types of aggregate shocks, no other controls are needed to establish causality or account
for potential omitted variables. On the RHS, I use contemporaneous and 3 lagged values
of credit supply shocks to account for the dynamic response of job flows to the shocks.
Beyond the forth quarter, I do not find a significant effect for the shock series on the
disaggregate flows series.
Table 1.6 reports the estimates of equations (1.12). A single standard deviation expan-
sionary credit supply shock creates a net increase in employment of 144702.34 jobs on
impact. Net job flows continue to rise over the three quarters following the shock. The
effect on job destruction (1.6% decline in job losses) is immediate, driving the short term
effects of the shock on net job flows. On the other hand, the rise in gross job gains is
sluggish, occurring after one and three quarters since the shock took place. With respect
to the roles of the intensive versus extensive margins, table 1.6 indicates that the inten-
sive margin plays the main role in the propagation of aggregate credit fluctuations to


































Table 1.3: Response of job flows and average wages to credit supply shocks by SIC sector
LHS variable Net job flows (1) Net job flows (2) Avg. real wage (1) Avg. real wage (2)
Net job flowst−1 0.48∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗




Construction 6896.69∗∗∗ 7018.62∗∗ −0.19∗ −0.19∗
(2052.43) (2142.26) (0.08) (0.08)
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate 903.88 915.75 −0.42 −0.39
(578.59) (573.39) (0.59) (0.59)
Management of Companies and Enterprises 901.92 917.18 −0.33 −0.31
(809.23) (813.63) (0.52) (0.52)
Manufacturing 1735.40∗∗ 1746.70∗∗ −0.08 −0.08
(544.26) (543.84) (0.08) (0.08)
Mining 972.35· 956.55· −0.46 −0.45
(519.35) (517.27) (0.34) (0.35)
Retail Trade 2216.85∗ 2248.89∗ 0.03 0.03
(979.62) (985.68) (0.07) (0.07)
Services 2223.76∗∗ 2227.03∗∗ −0.18· −0.18·
(846.25) (835.81) (0.09) (0.09)
Trans., Comm. and Public Util. 1382.70∗∗ 1373.44∗∗ −0.12 −0.11
(525.94) (512.75) (0.12) (0.12)
Wholesale Trade 2146.39∗ 2181.84∗ −0.25∗ −0.25∗
(928.56) (937.27) (0.12) (0.12)
(0.06) (0.06)
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes
Time fixed effects no yes no yes
R2 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.15
Adj. R2 0.23 0.17 0.20 0.13
Num. obs. 8600 8600 8600 8600
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1
The table reports the effect of exogenous credit supply fluctuations on net job flows and average wages by SIC sector, using OLS fixed effects estimation of
equations (1.8) and (1.9). Inference is based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998)’s SCC estimator (spatial correlation consistent) which relies on T asymptotics
and accounts for serial correlation between residuals from the same industry in different time periods, cross-serial correlation between different industries















Table 1.4: Financial heterogeneity in the transmission of credit supply shocks to industry-level net job flows
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
s=0 s=1 s=2 s=3 s=0 s=1 s=2 s=3
Net job flowst−s−1 0.58∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.51∗∗∗ 0.37∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗ 0.23∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
CreditSupplyt−s 2713.63 8567.23∗∗ 6267.83∗∗ 5726.87∗∗
(1956.05) (3029.06) (2252.84) (2163.35)
log(Avg. real wagest−s−1) 2780.98 3203.74 5368.13 1487.19 2730.81 9663.10∗∗∗ 8596.77∗ 6143.15·
(3219.04) (3149.84) (4748.36) (2871.55) (2788.53) (2438.82) (3375.81) (3303.89)
log(Salest−s−1) −5978.64 −9204.25· −9893.42∗ −8278.35∗ −4921.42 −7340.68 −4917.60 −3975.09
(4472.24) (4952.12) (4556.08) (4018.58) (3148.19) (5209.30) (4941.56) (4217.81)
log(Operational incomet−s−1) 135331.38· 120434.43 91007.72· 82072.56 78709.69 36293.34 −18123.98 14189.70
(69559.32) (77485.40) (53269.67) (60332.97) (56481.76) (71371.37) (66914.79) (66835.46)
log(Current liabilitiest−s−1) 2551.62 −1622.06 −1189.18 −5218.54 4610.85∗ 2845.71 5114.26∗ 2011.38
(2164.57) (2903.10) (3312.97) (3529.46) (1954.24) (2456.09) (2291.73) (2814.53)
log(Total liabilitiest−s−1) −1656.17 −340.60 −599.32 1285.63 −598.65 −269.17 −2422.98 −3483.13
(2403.12) (2640.34) (3190.89) (3159.35) (2405.30) (2903.53) (3023.73) (2891.19)
log(Fixed assetst−s−1) 4115.49 9997.93· 9368.23· 10327.35∗ −138.46 2406.86 −266.94 1298.93
(3931.64) (5659.91) (5594.27) (4997.91) (2180.33) (3218.27) (3155.08) (2899.40)
log(Total assetst−s−1) 1958.62 1497.40 552.31 −407.17 520.36 −1334.11 −533.38 −208.58
(2912.94) (3822.69) (3815.64) (3210.13) (884.27) (1090.57) (1059.05) (1203.57)
log(Total employmentt−s−1) −9359.87∗∗ −12380.01∗∗ −13987.89∗∗∗ −12790.41∗∗∗ −5023.81∗∗∗ −4832.97∗∗ −7104.05∗∗∗ −6417.86∗∗
(3288.63) (4621.29) (3880.93) (3745.55) (1440.71) (1866.96) (2119.97) (2229.75)
CreditSupplyt−s × log(CurrLiab.t−s−1) 1131.38 4165.65∗∗ 3047.77∗∗ 2838.87∗ −163.25 2568.55· 614.89 1453.08
(1000.71) (1529.83) (1107.84) (1116.96) (1124.01) (1320.33) (1112.69) (1109.97)
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time fixed effects no no no no yes yes yes yes
R2 0.44 0.33 0.19 0.17 0.27 0.16 0.07 0.08
Adj. R2 0.43 0.31 0.17 0.15 0.22 0.10 0.00 0.02
Num. obs. 1495 1470 1445 1420 1495 1470 1445 1420
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1
The table reports the OLS fixed effects estimation of equation (1.10) for the relation between an industry’s propensity to hire or fire workers in reaction
to exogenous credit supply movements, and the level of its current liabilities. Inference is based on Driscoll and Kraay (1998)’s SCC estimator (spatial
correlation consistent), which relies on T asymptotics and accounts for serial correlation between residuals from the same industry in different time periods,


































Table 1.5: Heterogeneous productivity in the transmission of credit supply shocks to industry-level net job flows
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
s=0 s=1 s=2 s=3 s=0 s=1 s=2 s=3
Net job flowst−s−1 0.48∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗ 0.28∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.12) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.09) (0.08) (0.10)
CreditSupplyt−s 1607.47 5114.35∗ 144.73 3375.00∗
(2124.62) (2058.17) (1632.29) (1324.73)
log{Avg. real wages}t−s−1 −2463.90 −4615.01∗ −4833.01∗ −6837.12∗ 3675.96∗ 2225.03 1664.89 228.32
(2054.84) (1943.55) (2364.75) (2914.92) (1619.40) (1763.31) (1682.97) (1797.20)
CreditSupplyt−s × log{Avg. real wagest−s−1} −187.23 −976.53· 418.27 −611.47 −422.54 −1021.40∗ 272.28 −764.68·
(615.94) (549.05) (550.29) (427.48) (551.70) (517.23) (585.80) (442.24)
Industry fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Time fixed effects no no no no yes yes yes yes
R2 0.23 0.21 0.10 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.08 0.17
Adj. R2 0.23 0.20 0.09 0.17 0.17 0.14 0.06 0.15
Num. obs. 8600 8514 8428 8342 8600 8514 8428 8342
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1
The table reports the OLS fixed effects estimation of equation (1.11) for the relation between an industry’s propensity to hire or fire workers in reaction to
exogenous credit supply movements, and the level of its labor productivity, as proxied by its average real wage. Inference is based on Driscoll and Kraay
(1998)’s SCC estimator (spatial correlation consistent), which relies on T asymptotics and accounts for serial correlation between residuals from the same
















Table 1.6: Heterogeneity across job flows in response to aggregate credit supply shocks (Aggregate time series specification)
LHS variable Net job flows Gross job gains Openings Expansions Gross job losses Closings Contractions
(Intercept) 284306.2722∗∗∗ 15.8351∗∗∗ 14.2231∗∗∗ 15.6116∗∗∗ 15.7963∗∗∗ 14.1575∗∗∗ 15.5795∗∗∗
(54520.0014) (0.0083) (0.0149) (0.0073) (0.0087) (0.0142) (0.0079)
CreditSupplyt 144702.3419∗∗ 0.0033 0.0044 0.0029 −0.0159· −0.0100 −0.0173∗
(54724.0103) (0.0083) (0.0149) (0.0073) (0.0087) (0.0143) (0.0080)
CreditSupplyt−1 255047.2712∗∗∗ 0.0161· 0.0132 0.0168∗ −0.0184∗ −0.0153 −0.0190∗
(53815.9498) (0.0082) (0.0147) (0.0072) (0.0086) (0.0140) (0.0078)
CreditSupplyt−2 169071.3992∗∗ 0.0102 0.0040 0.0118 −0.0124 −0.0068 −0.0137·
(53486.4106) (0.0081) (0.0146) (0.0071) (0.0085) (0.0140) (0.0078)
CreditSupplyt−3 173967.7333∗∗ 0.0165∗ 0.0137 0.0171∗ −0.0068 −0.0009 −0.0083
(53229.3250) (0.0081) (0.0145) (0.0071) (0.0085) (0.0139) (0.0077)
R2 0.3333 0.0890 0.0190 0.1242 0.0960 0.0188 0.1290
Adj. R2 0.3047 0.0498 -0.0231 0.0865 0.0571 -0.0234 0.0915
Num. obs. 98 98 98 98 98 98 98
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, ·p < 0.1
The table reports the effect of exogenous credit supply fluctuations on job flows by type, using a simple OLS estimation of equation 1.12. Other than net
flows, all other flows are in log levels.
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1.3 Theoretical Framework
This part of the paper connects the empirical results within a theoretical framework and
rationalizes the mechanism and composition effects suggested by the paper. Specifically,
it formally explains why credit expansion could contribute to a decline in aggregate labor
share, including the aggregate labor intensity and wage. I show within this framework
that an expansionary shift in credit supply affects firms with varying degrees depending
on the level of their financing costs. In reaction to this exogenous movement, each
firm responds by increasing its labor intensity and wage paid per worker. However,
at the aggregate level, across the firm distribution, the average results could be the
opposite. The model shows that credit expansion can stimulate growth disproportionately
across firms, where firms facing higher borrowing costs and have preferences for capital
investment over hiring grow at a higher rate.
In the following theoretical exposition, I adopt small letters to indicate individual firm
level variables and capital letters for aggregate variables.
1.3.1 Economic environment
Two types of agents inhabit the model: A single representative bank and heterogeneous
firms that differ with respect to their idiosyncratic productivity, asset size, liabilities
employment level, and wages. Both agents are financially constrained and face balance
sheet shocks. Default is endogenous for the two types of agents, giving rise to three
distinct interest rates: risk free rf , base rate rb, and firm loan rate r˜i. The first is the risk
free rate and is set exogenously to the model dynamics. The aggregate base rate includes
a premium that compensates lenders in the interbank lending market and is determined
based on the aggregate level of the sector’s net worth. The third loan rate includes an
additional premium, derived based on the idiosyncratic risk of each firm.
Thus, the model distinguishes between the two types of risk (i.e. firms and banks’)
that drive borrowing spreads (Townsend (1979), Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999),
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) and Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012)). In addition, aggregate
labor supply is homogeneous and unlimited, while hiring and firing has convex costs,
reflecting expenses on vacancy posting, search, and training required for hiring, as well as
severance payments and job restructuring following firing. Lastly, employers and workers
share the surplus their match is expected to create, with labor wage is determined through
a bargaining process at each firm; a distribution of wages arises across firms that depend
on the firm growth outlook, size of labor stock, and default probability.
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Firms
The world is populated by a large number of heterogeneous risk neutral firms, producing
homogeneous output at the beginning of every period, using predetermined capital, ki,
and labor, ni, stocks via Cobb-Douglas technology. Output is subject to uncertainty that
depends on a stochastic idiosyncratic productivity process. z follows an autoregressive log-
normal specification, subject to exogenous i.i.d shocks z ∼ N(0, σz). There is a common
capital depreciation rate, δ, with firms paying taxes on their cash flow and receiving
deductions for their depreciation and debt services (Hennessy and Whited (2007)). Thus,
debt financing is desirable for its tax shield benefits.
In addition, firms are also subject to an idiosyncratic net worth shock, ωi, (i.e balance
sheet or capital quality shock, similar to Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010)), which follows a
stochastic i.i.d process ∼ LogNormal(µω, σωi ). Since the capital used in production is
homogeneous, we introduce net worth shocks, ω, to capture all idiosyncrasies in the ability
of entrepreneurs and firms that lead to different valuation of firms in the cross section.
For lenders, this is a source of risk that is independent of investment opportunities risks,
z. Qk is the price of both capital and finished goods, which is normalized to 1,
pi = ωiQKzkαnβ (1.13)
k′ = ∆k + ωi(1− δ)k (1.14)
n′ = ∆n+ n (1.15)
z′ = (1− ρZ)z¯ + ρzz + ′z (1.16)
Following standard notation, the future value of any variable x is x′. Every firm starts
with an individual state vector, si ≡ {a, l, n, z}, that includes its assets, liabilities, labor
stock, and productivity. Assets are the sum of cash flow and depreciated capital stock.
Liabilities summarize the total liabilities due to creditors, which were determined the
period before, in addition to losses due to ω. After realizing their net worth values at the
beginning of each period, assets net liabilities, a firm continues if its net worth is positive,
or exits if it is below zero.15
In addition to its individual state vector, firms also observe the aggregate state, Sagg ≡
{ξ}, which includes the value of the aggregate financial sector net worth shock. The
aggregate state vector allows market participants to extract the aggregate base interest
15I assume a continuation value of zero. Using other values as a default cut off does not affect the
model dynamics.
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rate rb.
NetWorth′ = QKa′ − l′ (1.17)
a′ = pi′ + ω′QK(1− δ)k′ − tc (1.18)
l′ = (1 + (1− τ c)r˜)b′ (1.19)
tc = τ c × (pi′ − δω′iQKk′ − r˜b′) (1.20)
Continuing firms invest in their capital stock by purchasing or selling capital, incurring
quadratic capital adjustment cost that depends on the gap between the desirable capital
level and their current assets; that is, capital is partially irreversible. The cost is scaled
by the size of the firm to make sure that the bite of the adjustment costs stays binding
as the firm grows. The formulation of capital adjustment costs here follows the typical
formulation in the literature (Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)),







Given firm expectations with respect to future returns, default probability, and its current
stock of labor, it determines the number of workers to hire or fire, subject to quadratic
hiring and firing costs (Bentolila and Bertola (1990), Cooper and Willis (2009)) in the







Firms live infinitely and maximize the discounted sum of their infinite dividend stream,
d, by choosing the optimal amount of tomorrow’s capital and labor stocks. They start
with equal amount of equity and fund their financing gap through borrowing b or issuing
equity when d < 0. Equity issuance is subject to a quadratic cost function, making debt












d = NetWorth+ b′ −QKk′ − w × n′ − c∆K − c∆N − cEq (1.25)
cEq = γEqd2 if d < 0 (1.26)
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The loan contract
The loan contract is subject to an incentive compatibility constraint following the struc-
ture of Townsend (1979) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). The banking sector
charges r˜, which depends on the credit worthiness of the firm. It compensates the lender
for the bankruptcy losses in collateral value the bank would incur in case of firm default.











(1− τ c)z′k′αn′β + (1− (1− τ c)δ)k′i
}
Q(ω, dω′) (1.27)
where success and default probabilities depend on ω¯, which is the value at which the firm
has to endogenously choose default,




(1− τ c)Z ′k′αn′β + (1− (1− τ c)δ)k′
) (1.28)
Labor demand and wage setting In a standard frictionless economy with no hetero-
geneity, the representative firm hires labor until the marginal return of an extra worker
is exactly equal to her marginal cost, i.e. her wage. The aggregate wage level there is
determined based on the marginal dis-utility of workers in the representative household
and perfectly equates labor demand and supply. In addition, in that classical framework,
workers are paid after production is complete, allowing the firm to use the cash flow
generated by the labor force to cover its labor expenses. However, the model presented
here departs from this simple environment with respect to three elements.
First, I allow for labor market frictions by introducing hiring and firing costs, which is a
reduced form formulation of the effect on firm job flow decisions of expenses related to
vacancy posting, search, matching, and training in case of hiring, or severance payments
and job restructuring following firing decisions. These adjustment frictions introduce
a wedge between the long run and tomorrow’s optimal labor stock, implying that an
employment contract is particularly valuable for both employees and employers who would
have to incur additional costs (e.g. search costs) if they were to break their agreement and
look for another opportunity. Within such environment, both employees and employers
decide to share the surplus created by their match according to their relative bargaining
powers.16
16The key difference between this formulation and the typical search and matching framework is that
hiring costs here are constant over the cycle, not dependent on market tightness, and do not react to
aggregate fluctuations.
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The second point of departure is with respect to the timing of wage payments. In this
model, the firm has to pay workers upon hiring them and before production is complete,
which creates pressure on today’s liquidity. This does not need to be a problem in a
complete market where the firm could costlessly borrow today against expected future
gains. However, by introducing financial frictions, external financing becomes costly;
hence, borrowing to cover hiring costs affects the marginal return of the new worker,
which is discounted by how much it would add to the firm financing burden. This
combination of wage bill timing and financial frictions is what affects the relative price of
labor compared to capital. While capital is its own collateral, labor is not, making labor
less attractive for constrained firms (Jermann and Quadrini (2012), Calvo, Coricelli, and
Ottonello (2012)).
Finally, the economy we model here is one where firms are heterogeneous and the marginal
return to labor varies across the firm distribution depending on a firm’s net worth, size,
productivity, and aggregate financing conditions. This deviation from the representative
agent framework gives rise to a distribution of wages whose dynamics depend on variations
in both the cross section of firms and aggregate credit supply fluctuations over time.
To set their wages, firms engage with workers in standard Nash bargaining over the
expected returns of their match and they solve the following optimization problem,
maxw(JEmployed − JUnemployed)ψ(JFilled)1−ψ (1.29)
where JFilled stands for the firm’s net present value of the filled job, JEmployed is the
worker’s net present value of holding the job, and JUnemployed is his net present value if
he is unemployed instead. I show in the appendix building on Elsby and Michaels (2013)

















φω(ω′, dω)φZ(Z ′, dZ)φξ(ξ′, dξ)
}
+ Ψ∆
The first term on the left hand side is the cost of hiring or firing an extra worker. In case
of hiring, ∂c∆N
∂n′ is positive referring to the positive value the worker adds to the shared
surplus by saving the firm the need to hire another worker (e.g. vacancy cost in typical
search and matching). If the firm is firing, ∂c∆N
∂n′ is negative and the firm surplus is less
than what it could be if it were not for firing frictions. The second term is the discounted
value of expected future returns to staying employed, which depends on whether the
firm expects to be growing or shrinking in the future, as well as its default probability.
The third term is the difference between today’s and tomorrow’s net present value of
unemployment benefits and leisure utility.
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The financial sector I assume a single representative and risk neutral intermediary
whose role is to grant one period loans to the aggregate economy, B′. These loans are
borrowed by firms and constitute the assets side of the bank balance sheet. Expected
returns to these loans are (1 + rb)B′ based on the lending contracts to producing firms.
However, realized returns depend on the repayments it collects from borrowing firms,
where the total size of these repayments fluctuate as the number of defaulting firms
change over the cycle. Firm bankruptcy is costly to the bank, which has to incur the
losses associated with monitoring efforts and sale of the obsolete assets of defaulting firm.
These losses open a channel through which shocks in the real economy could gain further
persistence by hurting the asset side of the financial sector, which affects the volume of
future credit supply and the liquidity the financial sector could provide without having
to borrow, similar to Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010).




(1 + r˜i)bi −
∑
Defaults
(1− µ)liqV aluei (1.31)
The bank starts the initial period with a predetermined endowment of cash deposits;
then, it finances its lending activities primarily by borrowing from the interbank market
if its own cash on hand is not sufficient to cover requested firm loans B′. Lenders in
the interbank market realize that the borrowing capacity (i.e. balance sheet) of the
banking sector is subject to unexpected exogenous shocks, ξ, that are independent of the
idiosyncratic firm shocks ω, z.
ξ encompasses all sources of risk that have their origin within the financial sector, such
as prudential regulatory changes, fluctuations in market confidence and sentiments, con-
tagious international financial events, or arrival of news with new information about the
true risk of bank assets. Consequently, lenders associate a positive probability to a de-
fault event of the banking sector if ξ ≤ ξ¯, and require a premium over the risk free rate,
whereby the banking sectors pays an interest rate rb ≥ rf depending on the aggregate
risk of financial sector disturbances.
The banking sector net worth evolves accordingly, where every period it collects debt plus
interest repayments (net defaults) and pays back its liabilities to lenders in the interbank
market. Moreover, the bank has to pay a dividend to its shareholders equal to the risk
free rate, rf , and I also allow for a constant reserve ratio that has to be set aside for
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regulatory purposes,
netW ′Bank = ξ × (1− rf −ReserveRatio)
{
R′Bank − (1 + rb)BInterBank
}
(1.32)
B′InterBank = B′ − netWBank (1.33)
Since such a default event would have extreme consequences, I assume that lenders to the
bank believe that the liquidation value of the banking sector under such circumstances
would be zero (i.e. µBank = 1),17




ln{ξ′} = (1− ρξ) ln{ξ0}+ ρξ ln{ξ′}+ ′ξ (1.35)
ξ ∼ N(0, 1) (1.36)
where success and default probabilities depend on ξ¯, which is the value at which the bank
has to endogenously default.




The bank maximizes profits subject to the borrowing constraint (1.34) and the return
function (1.30), which yields a corner solution where the bank lends all the demanded
loans. If B′ < netWBank, the bank does not access the interbank market and the base
rate charged to firms in this case reduces to the risk free rate, rb = rf .
This intuition here is essentially similar to Kiyotaki and Moore (2012) and Gertler and
Kiyotaki (2015); however, while they use the limited enforcement constraint with no
default risk of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) to model the financial contracts in the interbank
market, I implement the financial contract of Townsend (1979) and Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999), in the same fashion used above for the firm borrowing contract.
This allows for default risk on the bank side and makes borrowing costly in the interbank
market when the balance sheet of the bank sector is weak. The premium the bank has
to pay is a function of the state of its balance sheet (i.e. net worth).
This is an additional amplifying channel to the transmission of economic shocks; an event
that hurts bank valuation and net worth, lowers its borrowing capacity and raises its de-
fault risk, resulting in higher premiums over borrowing between the bank and its lenders.
Consequently, firms that borrow from the bank have to pay extra on their premiums to
17This assumption is only a matter of calibration and does not affect the mechanisms and intuition of
the model.
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cover for the increased lending costs in the interbank market. This mechanism could lead
unexpected economic events to take the form of a financial shock that lowers aggregate
credit supply volume and raises the premium on loans to the real economy; this descrip-
tion matches the kind of credit supply shocks we identified in the SVAR exercise in the
first part of the paper.
1.3.2 Model solution and calibration
The firm problem is solved globally using nonlinear methods, where I iterate over the
Euler equation using time iterations and linear interpolation (Rendahl (2015)). Expec-
tations are approximated using Tauchen and Hussey (1991) discritization approach over
the three sources of idiosyncratic and aggregate uncertainty (z, ω,Ξ). Aggregation fol-
lows Krusell and Smith (2006) where agents use linear forecasting rules to construct their
estimates of base rate depending on the aggregate state of the financial sector.
With respect to parameterization, table 1.8 summarizes the values assigned to the model
parameters. A set of the model parameters are calibrated following standard values in the
literature, while the rest is fitted to match the empirical moments reported in Michaels,
Page, and Whited (2018) and Covas and Den Haan (2012), conditioning on the fixed
parameters. Specifically, the matching exercise focuses on the parameters that govern
the financial sector (σξ) and firm investment and financing decisions, in addition to the
dynamics of wages and the effective relative price of labor.
The firm net worth risk parameter σω drives the price of firm loan spread and therefore
affects firm demand for debt financing. I calibrate it to match the model simulated
mean leverage to the mean leverage value reported in Michaels, Page, and Whited (2018)
sample. Equity issuance cost γEq determines firm demand and access for equity financing.
There are possibly two ways to set the parameter value depending on the type of firms we
emulate with the model: First, it could be set to match the reported standard deviation
of SEOs issuing costs, reported in Covas and Den Haan (2012) of 0.6%. However, the
majority of firms do not have access to equity markets in the standard sense, and these
reported costs are not representative of the costs they incur to attract private shareholders
funds.
Therefore, I fix the equity cost parameter to match the default probability of simulated
and empirical value. The idea is that a firm access to equity determines how much it is
willing to accept high borrowing costs from the banking sector. If equity is costless, then
a firm will not borrow more than the level where the marginal tax shield advantage of
debt equals its marginal cost. Hence, the cost of borrowing is indicative of the cost of
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access to private equity funds. This only holds because σω is already anchored based on
the leverage moment. Hull, Predescu, and White (2005) reports a value of 1.86% spread
on BAA bonds and 2.4% expected default probability, which are similar values to the
figures Covas and Den Haan (2012) and Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) use.
Adjustment cost parameters for capital γ∆K and labor γ∆N are set to match the standard
deviation of capital investment and hiring rates in Michaels, Page, and Whited (2018)
sample, respectively. The standard deviation of firm productivity σz matches the sim-
ulated and empirical firm cash flow volatility reported in Michaels, Page, and Whited
(2018).
Finally, the bank net worth risk σξ drives the credit supply relevant margin of the risk
premium paid by firms rb−rf . Given that firms with AAA credit rating are very rare, with
very low expected default probabilities (their default rate per year is 0.0004 according
to Hull, Predescu, and White (2005)), I use the premium they pay on their debt as a
proxy for the basis premium rb − rf that banks pay in the interbank market. In other
words, I assume that AAA firms do not have idiosyncratic default risk. Hull, Predescu,
and White (2005) reports a value of 0.83% AAA premium over the risk free rate.
1.3.3 Discussion
The goal of the theoretical heterogeneous firms framework that we laid down so far is
to rationalize the labor market responses to credit supply shocks, as observed in the
empirical part of the analysis, and reproduce the distinction between the within and
composition effects. Since the role ξ plays in the theoretical framework comes very close
to the role implied by our identification of credit supply shocks in the aggregate SVAR
model, the dynamics implied by the model in response to a balance sheet shock in the
financial sector can help us understand the observed responses to the SVAR credit supply
shocks. Specifically, the model is constructed to show how the composition effects of credit
expansion lower the aggregate labor share. In supporting the following propositions, I
rely on the numerical solution of the model policy functions, since the model has no closed
form solution.
A key characteristic of the economic environment implied by the model is that introducing
financing costs augment the relative price of labor to capital, making the latter effectively
cheaper (Petrosky-Nadeau (2014)). This is because, unlike labor, capital has a collateral
value that lowers its financing costs, in addition to its marginal contribution to future
production. Figure 1.4 plots the marginal effect of capital, labor and borrowing on the


















Table 1.7: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value
Risk free rate rf 0.025 Michaels, Page, and Whited (2018)
Capital share in production α 0.3
Labor share in production β 0.57
Labor bargaining power ψ 0.3 Michaels, Page, and Whited (2018)
Unemployment benefits Ψ 1
Corporate tax rate τ c 0.257
Default cost µ 0.2 Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)
Firm productivity persistence ρz 0.5 Michaels, Page, and Whited (2018)
Bank net worth shock persistence ρξ 0
Table 1.8: Matched Parameters
Parameter Value Target moment Empirical value Simulated value
Firm net worth shock standard deviation σω 0.42 Leverage ratio 0.35 0.32
Capital adjustment cost γ∆K 0.385 Std. dev. investment 0.017 0.019
Labor adjustment cost γ∆N 0.095 Std. dev. employment growth 0.060 0.058
Equity issuance cost γEq 0.19 BAA spread 1.86 1.85
Firm productivity shock standard deviation σz 0.01 Std. dev. of operating income 0.019 0.04
Bank net worth shock standard deviation σξ 0.19 AAA spread 0.0086 0.0087
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and policy variables constant. Despite the larger share of labor in production, i.e. α < β,
capital plays a larger role in influencing firm default probability and financing costs; this
role could also be directly observed in figure 1.5, which shows the marginal effects on the
cut off default threshold ω¯. The two curves for k′ and n′ diverge as leverage increases,
implying that the wedge created between the relative prices of labor and capital rises
with the rise in firm financing needs and default probability. The following proposition
summarizes this point.
Proposition 1. Financing costs raise the effective prices of both labor and capital, thus
augmenting the effective relative price of labor to capital. Therefore, values of optimal
labor and capital decisions and the ratio between them (i.e. labor intensity) are smaller
for firms with higher financing needs and default risk (i.e. higher borrowing costs and








if netWorthi < netWorthj, and {k, n, z}i = {k, n, z}j∀ firms i, j.
Proof. The optimal labor and capital decisions that maximize the firm value must satisfy
the following Euler equations,
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The need to access external financing to buy capital and pay wages, when borrowing
is costly, lowers the expected marginal value of both capital and labor. The decline in
marginal value depends on the marginal increase in firm liabilities,
∂l′
∂n′









∂k′ (see equations (71 and 80) and figure 1.4) because of the capital collateral
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Figure 1.4: Marginal effects of capital, labor and borrowing on the firm risk premium
value, the decline in labor marginal value is larger than the decline in the marginal value















φω(ω′, dω)φZ(Z ′, dZ)φξ(ξ′, dξ) > 0
according to equations (71 and 80)) in the appendix, the size of the wedge grows in
proportion to loan size, leverage and r˜. These three variables correlate negatively with
the availability of internal funds (i.e. net worth).
The proposition is validated by the numerical solution of the model: Figure 1.6 plots the
cost of debt as well as the labor intensity of output based on the optimal capital, labor,
and leverage policies, over different values of net worth, for the same values of assets,
labor stock, and productivity. Because financing costs lower the relative price of capital
to labor, the optimal capital investment to hiring ratio increases as financing cost rises
and net worth falls (in the right direction).
The model also implies the following propositions.
Proposition 2. For any two firms, where one is hiring and the other is firing, the firing
firm must be in a state of higher financing needs and default risk (i.e. higher borrowing
costs and lower net worth), if they share the same values of capital and labor stocks and
productivity levels;






and {k, n, z}i = {k, n, z}j,∀i, j.
Proof. The proposition follows from the positive association between current net worth
and future optimal labor stock, implied by proposition 1, and the fact that the state
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Figure 1.5: Marginal effects of capital, labor, and borrowing on the default threshold
Figure 1.6: Labor intensity and average wage policies
The solid line on the left panel is the labor intensity of production implied by optimal capital and labor
policies over different values of liabilities to net worth, where the value of capital and labor stocks as
well as productivity are fixed at the center of their grid. The solid line on the right panel is the wage
a firm pays per worker as an outcome of the bargaining process. The dashed line is the borrowing
premium the firm pays on its debt. Lower net worth (moving right) is associated with higher cost of
borrowing and a decline in labor intensity and wages.
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space that determines a firm decision is fully covered by {k,l,n,z}.
The other dimension where the interaction between borrowing costs and labor demand
plays a role is with respect to the wage setting problem between a firm and its employees.
As equation (1.3.1) points out, the marginal wage depends, in part, on the future surplus
the firm-employee match is expected to create. Since the discounted expected value of
this surplus depends on the default probability of the firm, changes in ω¯ result in a change
in labor compensations. This point is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The optimal wage a firm pays per worker is lower for firms with higher
financing needs and default risk (i.e. higher borrowing costs and lower net worth, keeping
other state variables constant);
i.e. wi < wj if netWorthi < netWorthj, and {k, n, z}i = {k, n, z}j∀ firms i, j.
Proof. The optimal wage that solves the firm and workers bargaining problem is,
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+ δ
An increase in the expected default probability, lowers the discounted value of expected









φω(ω′, dω)φZ(Z ′, dZ), which lowers the wage value. ω¯
determines the default states and depends on the availability of internal funds (i.e. net
worth), see equation (1.28).
The proposition is validated by the numerical solution of the model: Figure 1.6 presents
the wage a firm pays per worker as an outcome of the bargaining process over different
values of liabilities to net worth for the same values of assets, labor stock, and produc-
tivity. Because financing costs and default probabilities factor into labor costs and its
expected surplus, the optimal wage declines as financing cost rises and net worth falls.
The propositions introduced above illustrate the association between a firm’s cost of
financing, on the one hand, with its labor demand and the wage it agrees to pay, on the
other. Next, I show that firm decisions to invest in reaction to an expansion in credit
supply depend on its default probability and the borrowing costs it faces.
Proposition 4. Expanding credit supply has a positive effect on optimal firm decisions
with respect to capital and labor stocks. Furthermore, the magnitude of the effect is larger
for firms with higher financing needs and default risk (i.e. higher borrowing costs and
lower net worth, keeping other state variables constant);




= f(netW ) and ∂x
′
∂netW∂ξ
< 0, where x ∈ {k′, b′, n′} and {k,n,z} are fixed.
Proof. According to the Euler equations (56, 58, and 57) of the firm problem, changes
in credit supply affect the firm optimization problem through its effect on the base rate
rb. The decline in rb that follows credit supply expansion implies that firms face lower
liabilities and, therefore, are less likely to default. Because of the convexity of the relation
between the price of risk and firm net worth, see figure 1.6, the decline in rb also translates
to a decline in the firm risk spread r˜ − rb. Moreover, the decline in r˜ − rb is stronger for
firms that used to face a higher r˜ and default probability, where the slope is steeper.
Putting these propositions together brings about the main argument of the paper: Ex-
panding credit supply raises output, labor intensity, and wages at each firm; moreover,
output growth at firms with higher financing needs and default risk is disproportionally
higher. Nonetheless, the optimal levels of labor intensity and wages for this group of
firms remain low relative to the mean firm, despite their marginal increase in reaction
to the shock. Hence, larger shares of total output and employment in the economy are
driven by lower level of labor intensity and wages, while the mean (i.e. aggregate) values
of labor intensity and wages fall. The following corollary summarizes this point.
Corollary 1. Expanding credit supply stimulates aggregate output growth, labor intensity,
and wages at the firm level; yet, composition effects exert negative pressure and weaken
its effect on aggregate labor intensity and the aggregate wage.
Proof. Recall the decomposition of the change in aggregate labor intensity and real wage,
equation (1.6),
∆Aggregate Labor Intensity =
within effect (+)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i
w0i ×∆LIi +
composition effect (−)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i
∆wi × LI0i +
interaction (+)︷ ︸︸ ︷∑
i
∆wi ×∆LIi
w0i and LI0i are the shares and firm labor intensity before a positive ξ shock, respectively.
The first term on the right hand side corresponds to within firm changes in labor intensity,
which takes a positive value in response to credit expansion, as implied by proposition 4.
The magnitude of the within term is expected to be limited due to the convexity of the
debt contract, proposition 4. Large firms that have large output shares w0i are less likely
to be facing high financing costs. Therefore, in reaction to the credit supply expansion,
their ∆LIi will be of lower magnitude compared to smaller, less liquid firms, which hold
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smaller shares w0i . That is, the potential of within effects to contribute to the growth
of aggregate labor intensity depends on the share of output that is carried out by firms
under tight borrowing costs.
The second term, which is the focus of this corollary, reflects the change in aggregate
labor intensity due to cross firms reallocation of output shares. Propositions (1) and (4)
conject that this term takes a negative value in response to credit expansion as firms that
face higher financing costs and maintain low levels of labor intensity grow by a faster
rate and occupy larger share of the total output. The potential of this channel to exert
negative pressure depends on the distance between labor intensity at firms facing high
versus low financing costs. The larger is the effect of borrowing costs on the effective
relative price of labor, the larger is the loss in aggregate labor intensity when credit
supply expands. Hence, an expansion in credit supply that follows extreme events is
expected to be particularly associated with low labor intensity.
The third term is an interaction of the two effects. By the same two propositions, this
term is also expected to take a positive value since the same firms that increase their
share, also grow their labor intensity more, when aggregate borrowing costs fall,
δwi > δ
w





j and {k, l, n, z}i = {k, l, n, z}j (1.38)
Hence, the corollary reference to the negative effects of credit expansion points at the
cross reallocation effect. Whether the aggregate effect is positive or negative depends on
the state of the economy at the time the expansion in credit supply takes place. A positive
aggregate effect is more likely if the state of the economy is one where the larger share of
firms struggle with high financing costs and there is not wide heterogeneity among them
with respect to these costs. As heterogeneity increases and the gap between firms’ access
to credit market widens, the aggregate effect is more likely to turn negative.
Similarly, the change in the aggregate wage can be decomposed in an analogous manner
that follows the same intuition.
The empirical analysis also documents the finding that credit easing lowers job losses
more than it raises job gains. The dynamics of the model and the composition effects
put forward by the paper provide an explanation, which is summarized in the following
corollary.
Corollary 2. Expanding credit supply decreases job losses more than it increases job
gains.
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Proof. The corollary relies on two elements. First, as proposition 2 suggests, firing firms
face higher financing costs than hiring firms. Second, from proposition 4, the effect of an
expansion in credit supply is stronger for firms that face higher financing costs. Putting
them together, it follows that job retention would rise more than job creation in response
to the shock.
Heterogeneous impulse responses across the firm distribution I summarize the
dynamics of the model through an impulse response analysis. The analysis shows how
the effects of an aggregate financial sector shock on firms vary across the net worth
distribution of firms, along the lines suggested by corollaries (1 and 2).
Figure 1.7 plots the baseline scenario of firms that belong to the 10th, 20th, 30th, 50th and
90th quantiles of the firm net worth distribution. In this scenario, simulation starts with
a large number of firms that are left to reach their stochastic steady state over a long
period of time, while all shocks are shut off at t 6= t0 (i.e. before and after t0). At time t0,
every firm receives an idiosyncratic net worth shock ωi, generating a distribution of firms
that vary with respect to their net worth and, consequently, optimal policy decisions
{k′i, n′i, LRi}. The presented firms have the highest net worth among their corresponding
quantiles, based on the net worth distribution at t = t0. I include more quantiles for the
lower end of the distribution because this where firms are most sensitive to fluctuations
in credit supply. At the upper end, the response of firms that belong to the 75th quantile
is hardly distinguishable from a firm that belongs to the 90th quantile.
In line with the propositions discussed above, the figure shows that lower net worth firms
are exposed to higher default probabilities and pay a higher financing premium. Firms
in the 90th hardly face any premium since their default probability is almost zero. More
importantly, the hiring rates of lower net worth firms are lower, the labor intensity of
their production is lower, they pay lower wages, and their shares of total output and total
employment are smaller.
Figure 1.8 plots how these different firms react when they are exposed to an expansionary
credit supply shock at t = t0. The shock leads to a decline in the aggregate base rate in
response to the exogenous increase in the financial sector net worth. The key observation
here is that the decline in default probabilities and financing premium is stronger for
lower net worth firms. That is, their borrowing constraint relaxes by a larger magnitude
compared to higher net worth firms. This differential response is an outcome of the
convexity of the loan contract, as discussed in proposition 4; a feature that is typically
lost in linearized models (Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014)).
This heterogeneity in the effects of the shock on the borrowing constraints of the three
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firms leads to faster growth in output, labor intensity, and wages for lower net worth firms.
As a result, the output share of lower net worth firms rises, and the within component
of aggregate labor intensity (∑iw0i∆LIi) and aggregate wage (∑iw0i∆Wi) take positive
values.
Nevertheless, as could be seen in figure 1.9, despite their larger expansion in response to
the aggregate shock, they still remain riskier than the median and higher net worth firms;
the higher risk implies that the low net worth firm maintains lower labor intensity and
wage levels while growing to occupy a larger output share of the aggregate economy. In
other words, the cross component of aggregate labor intensity (∑i ∆wiLIi) and aggregate
wage (∑i ∆wiWi) take negative values, exerting downward pressure on the aggregate labor
intensity and wage.
As discussed in corollary (1), whether the within or composition effects dominate depends
on the level of dispersion in financing costs or net worth across firms, and the share of
output produced by firms subject to tight borrowing constraint (i.e. under the steeper
part of the loan contract curve, figure 1.6). The wider the dispersion and the smaller
the share of tightly constrained firms, the more likely the negative effects dominate the
aggregate labor intensity and wage response to credit expansion. The negative empirical
responses of the two variables, documented in the time series analysis section of the paper,
suggest that, on average, fluctuations in credit supply are associated with dominating
compositional effects.
1.4 Conclusion
The analysis proposes an explanation why expanding credit supply can bring about a
jobless and wageless growth pattern. I start by exploring the causal relationship between
aggregate credit market fluctuations and the aggregate labor share in the United States,
using a novel narrative approach to identify aggregate exogenous variations in aggregate
credit supply within an aggregate structural VAR model. Against what theory predicts
at the firm level, I find a negative effect of credit expansion on both the aggregate labor
intensity (employment/output) and the aggregate real wage.
The explanation the paper proposes reconciles the firm level positive labor share effect
with the aggregate negative effect. I argue that credit supply expansion has heterogeneous
effects across firms depending on their borrowing costs. Therefore, in response to credit
supply easing, aggregate output grows primarily through the expansion of firms at the
lower end of the firm net worth and productivity distributions. Firms that belong to this
part of the distribution prefer investing in collateralizable capital over hiring and pay
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Figure 1.7: Baseline scenario
Stochastic steady state of firms that belong to 10th (blue solid), 20th (red dashed), 30th (orange dot
dashed), 50th (purple circles) and 90th (green crosses) quantiles of the firm net worth distribution. In
this scenario, simulation starts with a large number of firms that are left to reach their stochastic steady
state over a long period of time, while all shocks are shut off at t 6= t0. At time t0, every firm receives an
idiosyncratic net worth shock ωi, generating a distribution of firms that vary with respect to their net
worth and, consequently, optimal policy decisions {k′i, n′i, LRi}. The presented firms have the highest
net worth among their corresponding quantiles, based on the net worth distribution at t = t0.
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Figure 1.8: Impulse responses
Impulse responses of the firms that belong to the 10th (blue solid), 20th (red dashed), 30th (orange
dot dashed), 50th (purple circles) and 90th (green crosses) quantiles of the firm net worth distribution
to one standard deviation bank net worth shock (i.e. credit supply shock) which brings the base rate
down to the risk free rate such that rb = rf . The shock takes place at time t0, which is the time at
which the horizon of figure 1.7 begins. Capital investment rate, output weight, labor weight, hiring rate,
labor intensity, leverage ratio, borrowing spread and Equity issuance ratio are presented as the difference
between the benchmark scenario and the shock scenario ×100. On the other hand, output, net worth,
wage and default probability are presented as the log difference between the benchmark scenario and the
shock scenario ×100.
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Figure 1.9: Composition effects
The curves correspond to firms that belong to the 10th (blue solid), 20th (red dashed), 30th (orange dot
dashed), 50th (purple circles) and 90th (green crosses) quantiles of the firm net worth distribution after
one standard deviation bank net worth shock (i.e. credit supply shock) which brings the base rate down
to the risk free rate such that rb = rf . The shock takes place at time t0, which is the time at which the
horizon of figure 1.7 begins. The upper two plots are the impulse responses of the firms share in total
output and total employment, respectively. The lower two plots are the values of the labor intensity and
wages at the firms under the shock scenario. The plot shows that the credit supply shock drives the
share in total output and employment of firms that have lower labor intensity and pay lower wages.
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lower wages. It follows that by increasing the output share of these firms, the composition
channel of credit expansion exerts negative pressure over the aggregate labor share.
I report empirical evidence that, based on a long quarterly panel of industry level em-
ployment, wage, job flows, and balance sheet data for the US, supports this composition
mechanism. In addition, I construct a dynamic equilibrium model of heterogeneous firms
and an aggregate financial sector that accounts for the interaction between financial and
labor market frictions. Within this economic environment, I reproduce this heterogeneity
in the responses of firms across the distribution to a balance sheet shock that hits the
aggregate financial sector.
The paper therefore provides a novel insight that stresses the role of heterogeneity in
understanding the aggregate effects of credit market fluctuations with respect to the labor
market. It also raises the concern that the main thrust of expansionary credit policies
may not be targeting firms that have strong potential to create high labor productivity
jobs as their investment levels grow. Policies designed to boost growth in employment and
wages may find it more effective to prioritize demand and productivity-related channels
over the firm-borrowing channel.
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.1 Wage setting
This section derives the wage equation (1.3.1) based on a bargaining problem between
firms and employees (Michaels, Page, and Whited (2018)). The main distinction of this
approach from standard models of search and matching frictions is that wages are set
at the firm level, allowing them to vary across the cross-section of firms; in other words,
there is no single wage level for the whole economy.
The bargaining problem solves the following maximization,
maxw(JEmployed − JUnemployed)ψ(JFilled)1−ψ (39)
and the answer is the simple sharing rule,
(1− ψ)(JEmployed − JUnemployed) = ψJFilled (40)
where JFilled is the employer’s surplus from the rents generated by the joint efforts of
the worker and the firm, ∂V
∂n′ . At the point of negotiating wages, employment adjustment
costs (i.e. hiring or firing) are sunk,
JFilled = ∂V
∂n′










































where the last equality uses the firm first order condition, i.e. ∂V
∂n′ = 0. J
Employed is the
worker’s surplus which equals the wage it receives today, w, minus the unemployment
benefits she forgoes, δ, in addition to discounted value staying employed in the future,














φZ(Z ′, dZ)φξ(ξ′, dξ) (42)
Since the analysis is concerned with labor demand, I abstract from unemployment dy-
namics; once unemployed, a worker cannot access the labor market again. Nonetheless,
introducing unemployment dynamics will not change the predictions of the channel dis-












and using the sharing rule of equation (40) to replace J ′Employed,
















φZ(Z ′, dZ)φξ(ξ′, dξ) (44)
substituting equations (41, 42 and 43) into the sharing rule,
(1− ψ)
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Since wage setting takes place after hiring or firing by the firm is determined, contem-
porary labor adjustment costs are sunk at this point and do not appear in the wage
equation. This is similar to the typical search and matching framework where vacancy
posting and its associated costs take place prior to wage negotiations. Then using the





















This section derives the first order conditions of the firm maximization problem. Under
the problem description in section 1.3.1, the firm value function has the following Bellman
function representation,
V (a, l, n, z,K, ξ) = maxk′,b′,n′
{









V ′(k′, b′, n′, z′, r˜, ξ′)φω(ω′, dω)φZ(Z ′, dZ)φξ(ξ′, dξ)
}
(47)




(1− τ c)z′k′αn′β + (1− (1− τ c)δ)k′
}
(48)













cEq = γEqEq2 (52)
Firm loan contract:







































(1− τ c)Z ′k′αn′β + (1− (1− τ c)δ)k′
) (55)
The problem yields three Euler equations:
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φω(ω′, dω)φZ(Z ′, dZ)φξ(ξ′, dξ)
(58)































































































} = 0 (68)
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with respect to b′
∂Y
∂b′
= (1 + rb) =
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(1 + r˜)b′(−φ(ω¯)) 1
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(1 + (1− τ c)r˜)
)]
+ (1 + r˜)P (ω > ω¯)+
(1− µ)Q′Ka′0ω¯φ(ω¯)
[
(1 + (1− τ c)r˜)
)] (75)
with respect to n′
0 = EZ
{
(1 + r˜)b′(−φ(ω¯)) ∂ω¯
∂n′
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where k0 ≡ (1− (1− τC)δ)k



































































= 2τ divdpreΓ(−n′ ∂w
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where dpreΓi = QKai − li + b′i −QKk′i − C∆Ki (93)
.3 Bank Problem













db = ξN b −B′ − C lending(B′) (95)
N ′b = ξ′ × {(1 + rb)B − (Bankruptcy Losses)} (96)




db > 0 (98)
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where,
∂C lending













= E{ξ′}(1 + rb) (102)
∂C ′lending
∂(B′′/N ′b) = 2γ
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Chapter 3
The Role of Labor Market Frictions
in Structural Transformation
3.1 Introduction
Cross-country studies reveal a large gap in aggregate labor productivity levels between
countries at the opposite ends of the income distribution (Caselli (2005) and Erosa,
Koreshkova, and Restuccia (2010)). In a multi-sector economy, two factors determine
aggregate labor productivity: within sector productivity and the allocation efficiency of
resources across these sectors. Empirical work shows that countries struggling with low
aggregate productivity levels lag in both respects; first, levels of sectoral labor productiv-
ity differ widely across countries in favor of developed economies, with the differences be-
ing largest in the agriculture and services sectors, but smaller in manufacturing (Duarte
and Restuccia (2010), Gollin, Lagakos, and Waugh (2014)); second, there are larger
discrepancies in labor productivity levels across sectors within less developed countries
(McMillan and Rodrik (2011)).1
In this paper, I focus on the across-sector allocation efficiency as a determinant of ag-
gregate labor productivity.2 Theory postulates that the process of structural transforma-
tion within a country, whereby labor moves from low to high labor productivity sectors,
should be immediate and continue until productivity gaps across sectors cease to exist
(e.g. Laitner (2000), Ngai and Pissarides (2007)). However, against this prediction, large
1Taking Egypt as an example, the value added per employee (a measure of labor productivity) in
the agriculture sector in 2005 was 14.1 (constant USD), compared to 39.34 in France. In addition, the
ratio between labor productivity in manufacturing to agriculture was 2.74 in Egypt compared to 1.57 in
France.
2The observed difference in labor productivity of the same sectors across different countries has
received ample attention (Hsieh and Klenow (2009)).
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productivity gaps across sectors persist in most economies, suggesting the presence of
frictions that impede the immediate flow of labor toward its efficient allocation. In this
context, job flows across sectors are only partial and incomplete. The first goal of this
paper is to quantify the magnitude of these frictions as implied by the pace by which jobs
flow toward their optimal allocations.
The second goal is to evaluate the contribution of labor market regulations to these fric-
tions. That is, I explore whether variations across countries with respect to the tightness
of their labor market regulations could explain the heterogeneity observed among them
with respect to the persistence of across-sector productivity gaps. Economies facing lower
frictions enjoy more dynamic labor mobility and react faster to shifts in the drivers of the
structural transformation process, making productivity gaps less persistent. On the other
hand, excessive labor regulations make hiring and firing costly for firms, discouraging, in
return, both job destruction in lower productivity occupations and job creation in higher
productivity ones. These rigidities inhibit the efficient flow of jobs across sectors and re-
sult in inefficient allocations of employment shares and lost opportunities for productivity
growth.
Understanding the obstacles to an efficient structural transformation is particularly valu-
able for developing economies, which have set in place ambitious sectoral policies designed
to boost potential growth, but where productivity and employment outcomes continue to
lag. McMillan and Harttgen (2014) show that between 2000 and 2010, structural trans-
formation toward high productivity sectors accounted for roughly half of Africa’s growth
in output per worker.
To meet these goals, I estimate a dynamic panel error correction model (P-ECM) of
sectoral labor allocation using sector level data for a panel of 44 countries covering de-
veloped, emerging, and frontier economies. The choice of the model is motivated by the
observation that the process of structural transformation is non-stationary, where value
added and employment shares are cointegrated, being driven by the same underlying
process of technical change (i.e. changes in sector level TFP) or income growth (Herren-
dorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013), Ngai and Pissarides (2007), Laitner (2000)). The
P-ECM model is able to capture these key empirical patterns, while providing a measure
of the level of policy distortions or institutional costs that restrict the fluidity of labor
reallocation (i.e. speed of adjustment, Pagan (1985), Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991)).
These distortions cause short term gaps (i.e. errors) in labor productivity across sectors
by slowing down the efficient adjustment of employment shares in reaction to changes in
aggregate income growth or sector level TFP.
The paper’s contribution to the literature is twofold. First, it documents a new set of
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stylized facts with regards to the structural transformation process; I find empirical evi-
dence that labor allocation (i.e. employment shares) across sectors follows an adjustment
process, converging toward equilibrium allocations and closing around 15.4 % of labor
productivity gaps each year over the full sample, on average. The rate of labor flow varies
across country income groups and regions, with higher income countries enjoying more
fluid structural transformation processes than lower income countries. In addition to in-
come, I also find heterogeneity with respect to geographical regions, where Asia appears
to have been the fastest transforming region, followed by Latin America, Europe-USA,
and, finally, Africa. This is consistent with the large structural transformation wave that
took place in these faster regions in the second half of the twentieth century, compared
to the western countries that experienced their main wave in the 19th and 18th centuries,
and African countries that are yet to undergo a major transformation. Moreover, I find
that the rate of labor flows varies across sectors, implying different degrees of frictions
among them and indicating a role for sectoral policies.
With regard to labor market regulations, I find a significant positive association between
the pace of labor reallocation across sectors and the freedom level of labor market institu-
tions. However, in contrast to the classical intuition, I find that lowering firing costs slows
down the structural transformation process. This result suggests that the discouraging
effect of having lower job security on the labor supply side is stronger than the benefits
that firms gain from more flexible labor market conditions. Looking at the heterogeneity
at the country income level, I find that for low income countries, higher levels of average
labor costs, average employee payroll taxes, and minimum to mean wage ratios are asso-
ciated with a slower flow of labor across sectors. For high income countries, the effect is
insignificant, which implies that the effect of labor regulations on the process of structural
transformation is more binding for less developed economies.
Given this set of results, I argue that there is space for policy reforms in labor markets
to provide higher levels of aggregate labor productivity growth. However, policy reforms
aiming at improving the fluidity of structural transformation need to maneuver between
the goal of easing job creation and destruction, while supporting labor supply incentives
to reallocate and shift industries through strong social nets, labor protection, and risk
sharing. The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews existing liter-
ature related to structural transformation and constraints to labor reallocation; section 3
describes the data; section 4 carries out a decomposition analysis to quantify the role of
across-sector labor reallocation in aggregate productivity growth. Section 5 discusses our
data and empirical strategy; Section 6 discusses our results; finally, section 7 concludes.
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3.2 Literature Review
A large literature discusses the employment and participation rates effects of labor market
regulations, including labor cost, employee payroll taxes, and other welfare measures such
minimum wages and unemployment benefits (Siebert (1997)). The general agreement that
comes out of the literature is that higher employment costs and less flexible regulations
contribute to higher unemployment rates, where this line of argument is typically taken
to justify the differences in employment levels between the United States and European
economies. In this paper, I am more concerned with allocation efficiency; that is, I want
to understand to the effect of labor market regulations on job flows across sectors. The
answer to this question is less salient in the literature.
The efficient allocation of resources within a country can help close the gap between sec-
toral labor productivity levels within a country and raise aggregate productivity levels.
Krugman (1994) provides a less formal presentation of this intuition for the case of China
and the Soviet Union, where he argues that the significant rise in their productivity lev-
els stem from massive reallocation of factor inputs toward higher productivity sectors,
without necessarily raising sectoral TFP and efficiency levels. Restuccia and Rogerson
(2008) analyze the relationship between allocative efficiency among firms and aggregate
TFP. Their theoretical framework shows how frictions lead to a misallocation of resources
and a decline in aggregate TFP; that is, frictions lead markets to allocate firms a dis-
proportionate share of resources relative to their labor productivity. Hsieh and Klenow
(2009), applying this intuition to Chinese and Indian industrial firms, find large hypo-
thetical gains in productivity stemming from redistributing capital and labor resources
such that marginal returns among firms are matched to levels observed in the US. The
key contribution of these papers is to analyze the role frictions play in misallocation of
resources and its impact on sectoral productivity.
Against this background, several papers try to identify the key frictions that drive labor
and capital misallocations. Most of this work focuses on the firm-level. Haltiwanger,
Scarpetta, and Schweiger (2014), using a large sample of Eastern European firms, find a
statistically significant role for distortionary labor market regulations in hindering efficient
labor allocations. Bai, Carvalho, and Phillips (2015), assessing the role of credit frictions
across the US, find a positive significant effect of banking deregulation on the efficiency
of labor reallocation across firms. Trade costs are another source of distortions that allow
less productive firms to survive, while high productivity firms suffer costly access to local
markets. Costinot and Donaldson (2012) examine the empirical relevance of this intuition
within the agricultural sector to test Ricardo’s theory on comparative advantage.
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In addition to capital and labor adjustment costs and financial and trade frictions, another
set of frictions are more likely found in countries with less-developed institutions. For
one, the presence of large state-owned enterprises (SOEs) can be a source of distortion.
Subsidizing large and inefficient firms can drive resources away from more productive
entities, as argued in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) for the case of India. The spread of
an informal sector can also give rise to another source of distortions: in a study on
Indian and Mexican firms, Hsieh and Klenow (2014) observe that manufacturing firms
do not grow at the same speed observed in the US; Mexican and Indian firms tend to
prefer to operate in the informal sector to avoid rigidities in the regulatory framework,
but suffer lower productivity in return. At the sectoral level, McMillan and Rodrik
(2011) highlight several sector-level frictions: (1) customs on imported goods protect less
efficient firms from international competition, preventing labor force from shifting toward
more productive sectors of the economy; (2) currency devaluation practices can serve as
a subsidy to less productive firms; and (3) revealed comparative advantage in natural
resources or extractive sector.
Ciccone and Papaioannou (2008) analyses the flow of labor between sectors subject to bar-
riers to entry, documenting a significant role for this kind of friction among manufacturing
industries. Cheremukhin et al. (2017) finds that barriers to entry and monopoly powers
in the non-agricultural sector largely explain the failure to industrialize the Russian econ-
omy over the Tsarist and Soviet periods. There are no empirical studies that attempt
to estimate the frictions at the sectoral level and to quantify the impact of structural
reforms on sectoral labor reallocation. To this end, this paper proposes an empirical
methodology to measure frictions and the role of labor market reforms in supporting
structural transformation.
As suggested by the aforementioned studies, a specific set of structural reforms are ex-
pected to have an impact on structural transformation in this respect, of which labor
reforms are usually ranked high. A reform that has the potential to create jobs in higher
productivity sectors and allow more fluid mobility of labor could potentially do so through
the following channels, with respect to labor demand: 1) easing regulations around the
destruction of jobs in activities of low productivity; 2) lowering the costs of hiring in sec-
tors of higher productivity; 3) removing regulatory and market biases that would channel
more capital or financial resources to a sector than is justified by its relative value added;
4) allowing market access to competitive sectors; 5) boosting confidence and lowering
uncertainty about growth prospects in productive sectors, with respect to labor supply; 6)
protecting labor rights; 7) providing a social safety net that could encourage risk taking
in job transition; and 8) providing easier access and more exposure to opportunities for
training and skill development.
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3.3 Data
The dataset is taken from several sources. The Groningen Growth and Development
Center 10 sectors (GGDC) database provides data on annual series of value added, output
deflators, and persons employed for 10 broad sectors for 44 countries in the US, Europe,
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The sample period is unbalanced and runs between
1950 and 2013; see tables (.1.1 and.1.2).
The labor market regulations indicators are part of recent indices compiled by the IMF
of de jure reforms and liberalization in the real and financial sectors (IMF (2008)). While
these annual indicators span enacted reforms in other areas like international trade, FDI,
and the financial sector (banking system and capital market), in this study I only use the
labor market indices (Schindler and Aleksynska (2011) ). I examine four indicators: Av-
erage labor costs, average employee payroll taxes, ratio of minimum wage to mean wage,
and unemployment coverage. The first two measure the regulatory financial burden asso-
ciated with creating or holding a job, which increases proportionally with its productivity,
while the last two indicators reflect the welfare aspects of labor market institutions; both
areas are the subject of continuing debate on the optimal economic policies for inclusive
growth. The time interval is between 1980 and 2005.
In addition, I also use the labor market measures from the Economic Freedom indicators,
which are available on an annual basis from 2000 through 2013. These include measures
of hiring and firing regulations, centralized collective bargaining, mandated cost of worker
dismissal, and a labor market regulations summary index.
3.4 Structural transformation in aggregate produc-
tivity
I start the analysis by showing the magnitude of the role played by the process of struc-
tural transformation in the growth of aggregate labor productivity. To measure the
contribution to labor productivity growth from the reallocation of labor across sectors of





(P Ti − P 0i )S0i +
∑
i
(STi − S0i )P 0i +
∑
i
(P Ti − P 0i )(STi − S0i ) (3.1)
where Si is the share of sector i in overall employment, Pi the labor productivity level of
sector i, and superscripts 0 and T refer to initial and final period. In the equation, the
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change in aggregate productivity is decomposed into within-sector productivity changes
(the first term on the right-hand side that I call the "within-effect," also known as "intra-
effect") and two other effects. The within-effect is positive when the weighted change in
labor productivity levels in sectors is positive. The second term measures the contribu-
tion of labor reallocation across sectors, being positive when labor moves from less to
more productive sectors (structural change), our term of interest. The third term in the
equation is known as the cross term or interaction term. It represents the joint effect of
changes in employment shares and sectoral productivity growth.
Table 3.1 reports the computed results for all countries in our sample, and table 3.2
summarizes its statistics. Over the full sample, I find that the median contribution of
labor flows across sectors to aggregate labor productivity growth is 6.6%; however the
distribution is skewed to the left, with the left 14th quantile as low as 295.2 %. The
low magnitude of the median value and the very negative left tail reflect the difficulty
economies face in utilizing the structural transformation potential for productivity growth
as well as the high level of misallocation and failure of many economies to reallocate labor
toward higher productivity sectors over time.
On the other hand, breaking the sample by income group reveals that gains in the labor
productivity growth of high-income countries over the same time period appears to have
been far higher than that of low income countries. The median for the latter is negative
amounting to -53.9 %, pointing at lost opportunities in countries at the lower end of the
income distribution. High-income countries have a distribution of results with relatively
more symmetric tails and a median of 9.88% .
Table 3.3 reports the potential gains that countries could attain by merely mobilizing
labor across sectors such that labor productivity across sectors were equated, and table
3.4 reports its summary. The large magnitude of the figures especially for low income
countries, which ranges between 92.8 and 617.08 % give a profound motivation for policy
reforms that aim at removing institutional and regulatory impediments to labor flows
from low to high productivity sectors.3
3It is important to keep in mind that these numbers are only suggestive, given that the analysis
abstracts from possible non-linearities and changes in agents’ optimization decisions.
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ARG 106 9 -15
BOL 76 442 -419
BRA 102 24 -26
BWA 194 -17 -78
CHL 196 -27 -70
CHN 82 5 14
COL 1209 -2189 1080
CRI 127 80 -107
DNK 141 -19 -22
EGY 211 -46 -65
ESP 51 55 -6
ETH 23 150 -59
FRA 86 22 -8
GBR 137 -1 -36
GHA 85 19 -4
HKG 135 -5 -30
IDN 85 10 5
IND 76 32 -9
ITA 99 11 -10






KEN 228 -409 281
KOR 98 10 -7
MAR 111 10 -20
MEX 55 122 -77
MUS 95 20 -16
MWI -34 406 -272
MYS 115 -10 -4
NGA 433 -134 -199
NLD 72 33 -5
PER 132 -3 -29
SEN 103 155 -158
SGP 143 -22 -21
SWE 122 -8 -13
THA 50 63 -13
TWN 108 -6 -2
TZA 7 130 -37
USA 124 -3 -21
VEN 122 -109 87
ZAF 151 58 -110
ZMB 64 123 -86
Table reports the decomposition of aggregate labor productivity gains between 1990 and 2005 for all
countries in our sample, following equation (3.1). Numbers are in percentages.
Table 3.2: Summary statistics of table (3.1)
Median 84th Quantile 14th Quantile
Full Sample 6.60 67.50 -295.20
High-income countries 9.88 22.09 -6.19
Low-income countries -53.88 76.02 -573.99
The results are in percentage with respect to aggregate labor productivity growth between 1990 and
2005. Low-income countries include countries classified by the world bank as low or lower middle income.
High-income countries include those classified as high or higher middle income countries.
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The table reports the potential gains in aggregate labor productivity from reallocating labor across
sectors such that there is no labor productivity gaps across them. Computation is based on the observed
productivity and labor shares per sector in 2010. Computed numbers are in percentage as a ratio
aggregate productivity in 2010.
Table 3.4: Summary statistics of table (3.3)
Median 84th Quantile 14th Quantile
Full Sample 124.97 305.31 53.71
High-income countries 58.07 137.74 27.52
Low-income countries 168.65 617.08 92.79
The figures are the summary statistics of the expected gains in aggregate labor productivity from labor
reallocation across sectors in percentage terms with respect to aggregate labor productivity in 2010.
Low-income countries include countries classified by the world bank as low or lower middle income.
High-income countries include those classified as high or higher middle income countries.
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3.5 The ECM framework
3.5.1 Theoretical motivation
There are two main theoretical approaches attempting to explain the process of struc-
tural transformation across economic sectors in a growing economy. The first approach
relies on the demand-side effects generated by growing income when preferences are non-
homothetic (e.g. Laitner (2000), Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002)). As income levels
grow, consumption saturates for one sector after another, and the increase in wealth flows
into different sectors, i.e. after a certain level of income, consumption of manufactured
goods rises with higher income levels while spending on agricultural products saturates;
the same mechanism also works between manufacturing and services. According to this
mechanism, a structural transformation is a necessary feature that accompanies income
growth and an ever-continuing process, whereby the relative value added and prices of
saturating sectors decline perpetually.
The second approach is the supply-side approach, discussed by Ngai and Pissarides (2007),
where employment shares are driven by the relative magnitude of productivity growth
across sectors. Relative prices play a key role here; higher productivity growth sectors
experience lower relative prices since demand is unable to catch up with the increasing
supply of output. The lower prices put downward pressure on labor compensation and
prompts an outflow of labor from sectors with higher productivity growth rates, such
as agriculture, thus helping to restore the balance in labor productivity across sectors.
According to this channel, employment shares across sectors are set such that labor pro-
ductivity (i.e. wages) are equal across sectors, and structural transformation is triggered
when the growth rate of a sector’s TFP exogenously changes.
No matter which of the two mechanisms drives the transformation dynamics, labor moves
across sectors with the goal to restore the balance in labor productivity; otherwise, agents
have no incentive to reallocate. In a frictionless economy, this flow of labor ensures equal
labor productivity across any two sectors i and j at any point in time t in country c,
LaborProductivityi,t = LaborProductivityj,t (3.2)
V Ai,c,t × Pi,c,t
Ni,c,t
= V Aj,c,t × Pj,c,t
Nj,c,t
(3.3)
where V Ai is the value added per sector i, Pi is the relative price of sector i output, and
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Ni is the size of labor force it employs. This relation implies that sectoral employment
shares maintain the following optimal expression,
N∗i,c,t
N∗j,c,t
≡ V Ai,c,t × Pi,c,t
V Aj,c,t × Pj,c,t (3.4)
under either homothetic or non-homothetic preferences, and irrespective of how different
TFP growth rates are across sectors, theory predicts no gaps in labor productivity across
sectors.
Multi-sector growth models, like Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002)) and Ngai and
Pissarides (2007), assume a friction-less world, where labor allocations and prices can
fully adjust to restore optimality in response to changes in aggregate income or relative
sector level productivity, respectively. Nonetheless, in reality, structural market and
institutional frictions slow down this adjustment process, allowing labor to only partially
reallocate; as a result, a wedge grows between the observed sector level allocation of
labor and the optimal plan where labor productivity across sectors are equalized. It is
important to note that the rate of this partial adjustment and the size of this wedge are
both functions of the structural frictions impeding the efficient flow of labor force. I use
this intuition to quantify the magnitude of the frictions facing labor reallocation in the
economy by estimating the rate of adjustment within a Co-integrated Error Correction
Model (ECM).
Modelling structural transformation The ECM model can be interpreted as the
optimal adjustment rule in an economy where workers in lower productivity sectors for-
goes potential earnings by not reallocating toward higher productivity sectors and, at
the same time, they also face costs if they carry out rapid adjustments, i.e. reallocation.



















where Ni,t is the employment level in sector i at time t, which tracks, but may deviate
from, the optimal level N∗i,t, as described in equation (3.4). κ is the ratio of the marginal
cost of adjustment relative to the marginal cost of being away from the optimal allocation
N∗i,t.
Labor in lower productivity sectors reallocate, to minimize C in equation (3.5), such that
at any point in time t, the following Error Correction model exactly describes employment
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where λ ≡ 11 + κ is the speed of labor reallocation and 0 < |λ| < 1; if it is negative
(positive), the closer it is to 1, the faster the rate at which job flows are able to narrow
(widen) productivity gaps.
See Pagan (1985), Nichell (1985) and Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991) for a discussion of
the ECM model as an equilibrium condition within a rational framework of optimizing
agents facing adjustment costs.
The observation that the ECM model shows up as an analytical solution for the optimal
structural transformation process in a model where labor reallocation is costly is only
one part of our motivation behind the use of this framework. Another large part stems
from the fact that the ECM environment captures the main empirical patterns of struc-
tural transformation and, therefore, allows for a direct estimation of its key structural
parameters: First, the underlying process of structural transformation is non-stationary,
meaning that sectoral labor shares and productivity maintain a secular trend over time,
as observed in the data and documented in Herrendorf, Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013).
Second, since these trends are driven by the same underlying process of TFP or income
growth, they are co-integrated. Third, in the short run, sector output and employment
are subject to disturbances that move them away from their co-integration equilibrium
values. Fourth, there are frictions in the adjustment process of labor, output, and prices
that prevent an instantaneous reversion to the trend. By preserving the co-integration
relation between the variables, the ECM model allows for estimating both long and
short-term elasticities as well as the speed of the adjustment. While the model has a long
history in time series analysis, its application to panel dynamics is relatively limited (e.g.
Malpezzi (1999), Maddala et al. (1997), Yasar, Nelson, and Rejesus (2006)).
3.5.2 The role of human capital
One leading explanation that could be put forward to explain part of the persistence
in productivity gaps refers to the heterogeneity in human capital across sectors and
countries (Herrendorf and Schoellman (2017), Alvarez et al. (2018)). According to this
channel, workers do not reallocate from lower to higher productivity sectors not because
of institutional and market frictions, but because they lack the knowledge and necessary
skills to perform different tasks. Under this view, the flow of jobs from lower to higher
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productivity sectors stops when the skill barrier is reached, which occurs before labor
productivities are equated,
LaborProductivityi,t > LaborProductivityj,t (3.7)
let γi,j,c,t be the magnitude of the productivity differential between workers in two different
sectors i, j at country c at time t, then,
(1− γi,j,c,t)
(
V Ai,c,t × Pi,c,t
N∗i,c,t
)
= V Aj,c,t × Pj,c,t
N∗j,c,t
(3.8)
This specification implies that the human capital induced wedge in labor productivity
across sectors is a share of the labor productivity of the higher productivity sector; that
is, the higher the productivity of sector i, the larger the absolute value of its gap with
respect to sector j. For instance, assuming no market or institutional frictions in a
country like Egypt, labor should ideally be able to flow from the agriculture sector to
manufacturing, up to the point where the skill barrier binds; at this point, the gap between
average labor productivity of a worker in manufacturing and agriculture is γm,a,Egy,t
times the average labor productivity of a worker in manufacturing, which increases as
manufacturing productivity increases.
Hence, in a frictionless economy, the flow of jobs across sectors takes place such that the
sector level employment shares are described according to the following expression,
N∗i,c,t
N∗j,c,t
≡ (1− γi,j,c,t)V Ai,c,t × Pi,c,t
V Aj,c,t × Pj,c,t (3.9)
that is, the feasible optimal employment share of sectors with lower productivity and
lower skill levels becomes larger in comparison to equation (3.4) due to the introduction
of the human capital term γi,j,c,t.
This human capital channel raises a challenge for empirical work given the lack of a
good measure for human capital, in general, and at the sector level in particular. I
overcome this problem by making the assumption that γi,j,c,t is constant across countries
such that γi,j,c,t ≡ γi,j,t; in other words, I assume that the productivity differentials are
sector-specific irrespective of the country; for example, the difference in the skills required
for a job in services compared to manufacturing at year t does not depend on whether
these jobs are in France or Morocco. Continuing with this example, this implies that
116 CHAPTER 3. LABOR FRICTIONS IN STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION
the difference in human capital between any services and manufacturing is the same in
France and Morocco, even though there is a difference between the two countries in terms
of the levels of human capital in manufacturing or services.
3.5.3 Econometric specification
The goal of the econometric analysis is to estimate the magnitude of the frictions facing
sector level flows in labor markets across countries. Using the ECM model, I estimate
the speed of adjustment parameter λ for the whole sample, and for different sectors and
country groups. This parameter is the rate at which jobs flow from one sector to another,
which is an implied measure of the magnitude of adjustment costs (i.e. frictions). A
negative estimate of λ would imply converging productivity gaps across sectors, while a
positive one would imply a diverging pattern whereby gaps grow even wider.
In the baselines specification, I estimate λ for the full sample first and then attempt
to explore the heterogeneity across country groups and sectors by estimating it for the
corresponding subsamples. Substituting equation (3.4) into (3.6), after log transforming












































where Xt includes controls for factors that may justify persistent deviation (i.e. error)
in observed employment shares from the efficient allocation described by equation (3.4),
such as differences in human capital and the skill level of workers. I control for the
human capital effects by including a (sector ×time) fixed effect, given the assumption
discussed above of a constant γ across countries. The fixed effects also control for essential





exhibit similar trends that reflect the process of structural
transformation as the shares of labor and value added grow in manufacturing and services
at the expense of agriculture and other lower labor productivity sectors (Herrendorf,
4This econometric specification is motivated above as an equilibrium condition of the structural
problem facing labor force, and it is consistent with general specification of the ECM model discussed in
Sargan (1964) and Alogoskoufis and Smith (1991): ∆yt = λ∆y∗t − λ(yt−1 − y∗t−1)
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Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013)).
Specifically, Xt includes world real GDP growth rate, growth rate of countries real GNP
per capita, population growth rate, a global linear trend, as well as constant and linear
trend fixed effects: (sector × country) and (linear trend × sector × country); these ad-
ditional controls make sure that the estimated rate of adjustment captures only country
level market and institutional factors, and is not contaminated by the effects of demo-
graphic and other global and sector specific trends or global fluctuations. β1, β2 and β3
are the short term elasticities, λ is the adjustment speed, and δ1, δ2 and δ3 are the long
term elasticities.
Equation (3.10) implies that labor moves every period to correct past deviations from
the optimal values of employment shares (i.e. long term target), and to accommodate
contemporaneous changes in these optimal allocations (short term dynamics). In all
estimations, I always use the agriculture sector as sector j; such that employment and
value added shares as well as sector price levels are normalized by the corresponding
values for the agriculture sector.
The role of labor market frictions in labor reallocation
Next, I explore the answer to the second main question of the paper on the magnitude
of the part played by labor market regulations in the process of structural transformation.
I carry out this task by augmenting the baseline equation (3.10) to introduce a country


















Labor market Interaction︷ ︸︸ ︷
























Zt is a vector of controls for other areas of regulations that could be correlated with
the state of labor market institutions. For that, I use the IMF structural reform indices
for four key areas: capital flows, banking, domestic finance, and trade. In addition, I
also include the other components of the labor market regulations when examining their
interaction individually,
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λ2 is a measure of the contribution of Rt−1 in explaining the differences across high-income
countries in the average pace of job flows across sectors. I also add another interaction
term for low- and high-income country groups, to analyze whether the role labor market


















Labor market Interaction︷ ︸︸ ︷
λ2{Rt−1 ×Gapi,j,c,t−1}+ λ3{DLowIncome ×Rt−1 ×Gapi,j,c,t−1}+
βZt−1 + ui,c,t (3.14)
DLowIncome is a dummy for countries that belong to lower middle income and low income
classification of the World Bank. λ3 measures how much λ2 changes for low-income
countries compared to high-income countries.
3.5.4 Estimation
I estimate equations (3.10) and (3.11) in two stages. In the first stage, I extract the
stationary error term (i.e. the ’Gap’ term) using the co-integration relation (i.e. Long
run dynamics) in equation (3.10) by a Pooled OLS estimation. Panel unit root tests
confirm the presence of stochastic trends in the labor and value added shares, as expected.
Similarly, I also run another round of unit root and (non-)stationarity tests on the error
term to verify its stationarity; see Gengenbach, Palm, and Urbain (2009) for a survey of
unit root tests in the presence of cross-sectional dependencies.
In the second stage, I substitute this error term and estimate the short term elasticities
as well as the adjustment speed parameter λ using Fixed Effect OLS estimation. The
endogeneity between employment shares, on the one hand, and sectoral value added and
price levels, on the other hand, do not concern us because obtaining a consistent estimator
of short term elasticities is not the objective of the analysis; these two endogenous terms
work as conditioning information (i.e. controls) that allows the identification of the
adjustment rate parameter. In addition, the endogeneity induced by the inclusion of the
fixed effect in our dynamic setting (Nickell (1981)) is also not a concern given that the
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time dimension of the panel is fairly large.
3.6 Results and discussion
3.6.1 Baseline estimation
The results of the baseline regression for the labor reallocation process, equation (3.10),
are reported in Table 3.5. Our main interest is the estimated value of the adjustment
rate λ, which is the coefficient on the deviation or gap term. Its estimated value is -0.154.
The negative sign confirms a convergence pattern; that is, it verifies that, on average,
employment shares move toward closing the labor productivity gap across sectors. The
magnitude of the speed implies that the average economy in our sample reallocates its la-
bor across different sectors to close 15.4% of the distance between its current and desired
long run allocation within one year. It is important to note that by controlling for hu-
man capital, country income growth rate and other fixed effects, I make the assumption
that the economy’s desired plan of labor allocation across sectors does not necessarily
eliminate productivity gaps completely. While this assumption deviates from our theo-
retical motivation to some extent, it reflects the structural and technological barriers in
the economy that may not be easily surpassed overtime; for instance, sectors that rely
on natural resources like mining cannot fully expand enough to absorb all willing labor
force.








Est. Std. Error t-statistic p-value
Value Added ∆log{V Ai,c,t/V Aj,c,t} β1 = 0.323 0.011 0.297 0.000
Sectoral Prices ∆log{Pi,c,t/Pj,c,t} β2 = 0.048 0.010 5.029 0.000
Gap LT Dynamics λ =-0.154 0.008 -18.731 0.000
R2: 0.211
adj R2: 0.155
Unbalanced Panel: N. sector×country = 277, T = 4-50, N. Observations = 10748.
Time and Individual fixed effects OLS estimation.
The table reports the estimation results for equation (3.10). Estimation uses both individual (sector × country) and time
fixed effects, and robust inference, where clustering is on the sector × country level, which accounts for both potential
heteroscedasticity and serial correlations in the residuals.
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3.6.2 Baseline estimation across sub-groups
I repeat the estimation over sub-samples split according to income groups, regions, and
economic sectors, reporting the results for the adjustment rate in tables 3.6, 3.7 and
3.8, respectively. I find that the persistence of productivity gaps correlates with country
income; that is, high-income countries enjoy the most dynamic labor force, allowing them
to close productivity gaps across sectors with a faster speed (25.2 % a year). This speed
drops to 19.7 % for upper middle income countries, 12.5 % for lower middle income
countries, and 9.4 % for low income countries. Interestingly, these numbers reflect a
nonlinear relationship between country income and the flexibility with which it is able to
reallocate its labor force across sectors. I see that labor force mobility across sectors in
high-income countries is 5.5 % faster than that of upper middle income countries, but the
latter is 7.2 % faster than lower middle income countries. This difference shrinks again
between lower middle income and low-income countries to 3.1 %, pointing at a significant
institutional gap between low and high income groups.
Different channels could potentially explain this association between higher income lev-
els and higher sectoral labor mobility. The first channel, addressed by our analysis, is
the labor market regulation channel; higher income countries enjoy better institutional
frameworks that allows more fluid creation and destruction of jobs in reaction to changes
in sector level TFP or the aggregate income level. Another potential channel is linked
to the magnitude of geographical frictions, which limit mobility across regions and cities.
Since different regions may adopt different specialization patterns, the efficiency of the
structural transformation process depends on the capacity of workers to physically move.
Hnatkovska and Lahiri (2018) discusses the contribution of this channel in explaining
differences in the Chinese and Indian transformation experience.
Differences in human capital across income groups could also explain the disparity I ob-
serve in the fluidity of their structural transformation processes. For workers to efficiently
change sectors, they need to maintain adequate levels of transferable skills and educa-
tion. In both respects, I expect high-income countries to be in a better position given
the accessibility and universality of their education systems.
The results of reallocation speed across regions reveals another dimension of heterogeneity.
I find the fastest labor share dynamics in Asia, followed by Latin America, Europe-USA,
and, finally, Africa. This is consistent with the evidence on the significant structural
transformation that took place in these faster regions in the second half of the twentieth
century, compared to the western countries that experienced their main wave in the 19th
and 18th centuries, and African countries that are yet to undergo major transformations.
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What this tells us is that structural transformation is most dynamic in countries with not
just better institutions, as proxied by income, but also higher transformation potential.
Looking at the reallocation speed across sectors, we see that mining and manufacturing
are the fastest in attracting labor out of agriculture, followed by construction, utilities,
government services, and, finally, services sectors, such as trade, restaurants and hotels,
and transport, storage, and communication. The results reflect government efforts around
the world to move labor toward mining and manufacturing, especially mining which still
maintains the widest productivity gap in developing countries with respect to other sec-
tors. The estimates also point at the higher rigidity that faces the economy in reallocating
its employment shares toward services industries such as trade and communication.
Table 3.6: Rate of adjustment across income groups
Income Group N. Obs. λ Estimate Std. Error t-statistic p-value
High income 3233 -0.252 0.025 -10.087 0.000
Upper middle income 3684 -0.197 0.015 -13.542 0.000
Lower middle income 2913 -0.125 0.014 -8.650 0.000
Low income 918 -0.094 0.026 -3.587 0.000
The table reports the estimation results for the adjustment rate λ in equation (3.10) by income group. Estimation uses
both individual (sector× country) and time fixed effects, and robust inference, where clustering is on the sector× country
level, which accounts for both potential heteroscedasticity and serial correlations in the residuals.
Table 3.7: Rate of adjustment across regions
Region N. Obs. λ Estimate Std. Error t-statistic p-value
Asia 2800 -0.261 0.022 -11.903 0.000
Latin America 2412 -0.220 0.019 -11.524 0.000
Europe-USA 1911 -0.178 0.022 -8.136 0.000
Africa 3625 -0.102 0.011 -9.098 0.000
The table reports the estimation results for the adjustment rate λ in equation (3.10) by region. Estimation uses both
individual (sector× country) and time fixed effects, and robust inference, where clustering is on the sector× country level,
which accounts for both potential heteroscedasticity and serial correlations in the residuals.
3.6.3 The Role of labor regulations
In this part of the analysis, I assess the extent to which structural reforms and regulations
in the labor market are associated with less persistent productivity gaps across sectors.
Table (3.9) reports the estimation results for equation (3.11) for the full sample, where λ2
reflects the contribution of the respective indicator to the pace by which labor reallocates
across sectors. A negative estimate implies an accelerating effect, and vice versa. In table
(3.10), I repeat the same estimations while accounting for the heterogeneity between high
and low income countries. Overall, the data reflects a relatively large role for the area
122 CHAPTER 3. LABOR FRICTIONS IN STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION
Table 3.8: Rate of adjustment across sectors
Sector N. Obs. λ Estimate Std. Error t-statistic Pr(>|t|)
Mining 1569 -0.186 0.019 -9.909 0.000
Manufacturing 1579 -0.155 0.018 -8.614 0.000
Construction 1579 -0.147 0.018 -8.151 0.000
Utilities 1569 -0.143 0.017 -8.545 0.000
Government services 1196 -0.140 0.017 -8.427 0.000
Trade, restaurants and hotels 1579 -0.119 0.017 -7.152 0.000
Transport, storage and commu-
nication
1579 -0.115 0.016 -7.011 0.000
The table reports the estimation results for the adjustment rate λ in equation (3.10) by sector. Estimation uses both
individual (sector× country) and time fixed effects, and robust inference, where clustering is on the sector× country level,
which accounts for both potential heteroscedasticity and serial correlations in the residuals.
of labor market regulations as indicated by their corresponding λ2, λ3. Policy reforms
aiming at achieving efficient structural transformation need to maneuver between the
goal of raising labor productivity, while maintaining strong social nets, labor protection
and risk sharing.
For the full sample, I find that only two indicators are significant. The mandated cost of
worker dismissal and the general labor market regulations indices. Both indicators come
from the Economic Freedom indices and are constructed such that higher values indicate
more open and less regulated markets. The negative result of λ2 for the general labor
market regulation index is consistent with Haltiwanger, Scarpetta, and Schweiger (2014)
and implies that an increase in the freedom of labor market regulations by 10 on a scale
of 100 is associated with 7 % increase in the pace of job flows across sectors. Hence,
fewer regulations correspond to more dynamic labor force and more efficient employment
shares allocations.
Interestingly, the result for mandated cost of worker dismissal indicator is not necessarily
what one would expect to see in the typical discussions on labor market reforms. I
find that lowering the cost of worker dismissal dampens the pace of job flows. This
result suggests that reforms that undermine job security, while allowing firms to be more
dynamic and agile in reacting to market fluctuations, could have a strong discouraging
effect on labor transitions. This is particularly relevant for the structural transformation
process where job transition across sectors, which may also require migration, entails
higher risk and social costs than transition within sectors. Hence, the policy agenda on
labor market reforms needs to be advised on the effect of these reforms on labor incentives
to shift careers and reallocate.
Controlling for the country income level when estimating the effect of labor market mea-
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Table 3.9: The role of labor regulations
Indicator Source No. Obs. λ2 Std. Errors Pr(>|t|)
Hiring and firing regulations EF 974 -0.0035 0.0030 0.2396
Centralized collective bargaining EF 1050 -0.0020 0.0031 0.5300
Mandated cost of worker dismissal EF 432 0.0112 0.0033 0.0007
Labor market regulations EF 1024 -0.0078 0.0045 0.0875
Average labor cost IMF SR 3720 0.0014 0.0012 0.2436
Average employee payroll taxes IMF SR 3720 0.0023 0.0027 0.3878
Ratio of minimum wage to mean
wage
IMF SR 3720 0.0004 0.0011 0.6924
Unemployment benefits coverage IMF SR 3176 0.0019 0.0025 0.4382
Time and Individual(sector × country) fixed effects OLS estimation.
I scaled all indicators to a scale of 100
sures on the pace of structural transformation across sectors reveals some heterogeneity
aspects and allows a stronger identification of the effects of some of the measures (table
(3.10); in addition to the earlier results with respect to mandated dismissal costs and the
aggregate labor market regulation indices, the effects of both hiring, firing and bargain-
ing regulations are negative and significant. This result is consistent with the common
intuition, which suggests that lower regulations and more flexible wage setting can ease
the labor market dynamics. For these measures, there does not seem to be a significant
difference between high and low income countries.
More interesting, however, are the results for λ2 and λ3 for average labor costs, employee
payroll taxes, and minimum wages. While they remain insignificant for the high-income
group (i.e. λ2), they are positive and significant for low-income countries. An increase by
10 on a scale of 100 of labor costs is associated with 1.8 % decline in the pace of job flows
for low income countries, but has an insignificant effect for high income countries. This
number is 1.2 % and 4 % for 10 points increase in average payroll taxes and minimum
wages ratio to mean wages, respectively, in low income countries. What this implies is
that policy agendas need to be different for high- and low-income countries; for the latter,







































Table 3.10: The role of labor regulations
Indicator Source No. Obs. λ2 Std. Errors Pr(>|t|) λ3 Std. Errors Pr(>|t|)
Hiring and firing regulations EF 606 -0.0089 0.0035 0.0119 -0.0042 0.0026 0.1149
Centralized collective bargaining EF 681 -0.0053 0.0035 0.1318 0.0003 0.0014 0.8344
Mandated cost of worker dismissal EF 250 0.0113 0.0035 0.0016 0.0032 0.0048 0.5013
Labor market regulations EF 662 -0.0096 0.0065 0.1363 0.0004 0.0024 0.8760
Average labor cost IMF SR 2593 -0.0003 0.0014 0.8575 0.0021 0.0006 0.0005
Average employee payroll taxes IMF SR 2593 -0.0006 0.0026 0.8105 0.0018 0.0005 0.0005
Ratio of minimum wage to mean wage IMF SR 2593 0.0008 0.0012 0.4990 0.0032 0.0006 0.0000
Time and Individual(sector × country) fixed effects OLS estimation.
I scaled all indicators to a scale of 100
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3.7 Conclusion
This paper documents the role of labor markets regulations in the misallocation of la-
bor across sectors within the economy. The rigidities caused by these regulations inhibit
the efficient flow of jobs across sectors and result in inefficient allocations of employ-
ment shares and lost opportunities for productivity growth. Excessive labor regulations
make hiring and firing costly for firms, discouraging, in return, both job destruction in
lower productivity occupations and job creation in higher productivity ones. While these
frictions are also binding for many developed economies, understanding the obstacles
to efficient structural transformation is particularly valuable for developing economies,
which have set in place ambitious sectoral policies to boost potential growth, but where
productivity and employment outcomes continue to lag behind expectations.
Our analysis argues that addressing these labor market frictions could help promote more
fluid reallocation toward higher productivity sectors, raising growth and employment.
However, these policy reforms need to maneuver between the goal of easing job creation
and destruction, while supporting the labor supply incentives to reallocate and shift
industries through strong social nets, labor protection, and risk sharing. In addition, there
is no one-size-fits-all policy prescription for all countries, given individual circumstances
and growth experiences. Reform priorities depend on country-specific settings, including
the scale of particular policy distortions.
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Table .1.1: Sectoral Coverage
Sector name ISIC Rev. 3.1 description
Agriculture Agriculture, Hunting and Forestry, Fishing
Mining Mining and Quarrying
Manufacturing Manufacturing
Utilities Electricity, Gas and Water supply
Construction Construction
Trade services Wholesale and Retail trade; repair of motor vehicles, motorcycles andpersonal and household goods, Hotels and Restaurants
Transport services Transport, Storage and Communications
Business services Financial Intermediation, Renting and Business Activities (excludingowner occupied rents)
Government services Public Administration and Defense, Education, Health and Socialwork
Personal services Other Community, Social and Personal service activities, Activities ofPrivate Households
Total Economy Total Economy
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Table .1.2: Baseline Regression Country and Time Coverage
Acronym Country Nominal Value Added Sectoral Prices Sectoral Employment
Sub-Saharan Africa
BWA Botswana 1964-2010 1964-2010 1964-2010
ETH Ethiopia 1961-2010 1961-2010 1961-2010
GHA Ghana 1960-2010 1960-2010 1960-2010
KEN Kenya 1960-2010 1964-2010 1969-2010
MWI Malawi 1960-2010 1966-2010 1966-2010
MUS Mauritius 1960-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010
NGA Nigeria 1960-2010 1960-2010 1960-2011
SEN Senegal 1960-2010 1970-2010 1970-2010
ZAF South Africa 1960-2010 1960-2010 1960-2010
TZA Tanzania 1960-2010 1960-2010 1960-2010
ZMB Zambia 1960-2010 1965-2010 1965-2010
North Africa
EGY Egypt 1960-2013 1960-2012 1960-2012
MOR Morocco 1970-2012 1960-2012 1960-2012
Asia
CHN China 1952-2011 1952-2010 1952-2011
HKG Hong Kong 1970-2011 1974-2011 1974-2011
IND India 1950-2012 1950-2012 1960-2010
IDN Indonesia 1966-2012 1960-2012 1961-2012
JPN Japan 1953-2011 1953-2011 1953-2012
KOR South Korea 1953-2011 1953-2011 1963-2011
MYS Malaysia 1970-2011 1970-2011 1975-2011
PHL Philippines 1971-2012 1971-2012 1971-2012
SGP Singapore 1970-2012 1960-2012 1970-2011
TWN Taiwan 1951-2012 1961-2012 1963-2012
THA Thailand 1951-2011 1951-2011 1960-2011
Latin America
ARG Argentina 1950-2011 1950-2011 1950-2011
BOL Bolivia 1958-2011 1950-2011 1950-2010
BRA Brazil 1990-2011 1950-2011 1950-2011
CHL Chile 1950-2011 1950-2011 1950-2012
COL Colombia 1950-2011 1950-2011 1950-2010
CRI Costa Rica 1950-2011 1950-2011 1950-2011
MEX Mexico 1950-2011 1950-2011 1950-2012
PER Peru 1950-2011 1950-2011 1960-2011
VEN Venezuela 1960-2012 1950-2012 1950-2011
North America
USA United States 1947-2010 1947-2010 1950-2010
Europe
DEW West Germany 1968-1991 1950-1991 1950-1991
DNK Denmark 1970-2011 1947-2009 1948-2011
ESP Spain 1970-2011 1947-2009 1950-2011
FRA France 1970-2011 1950-2009 1950-2011
GBR United Kingdom 1960-2011 1949-2009 1948-2011
ITA Italy 1970-2011 1951-2009 1951-2011
NLD The Netherlands 1970-2011 1949-2009 1950-2011
SWE Sweden 1970-2011 1950-2009 1950-2011
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Erstes Kapitel Die Phase der wirtschaftlichen Erholung in den USA nach der "Great Re-
cession" ist charakterisiert durch Produktionswachstum bei gleichzeitiger Stagnation von
Beschäftigung und Löhnen. Dies führt zur Frage, warum Maßnahmen zur Förderung der
Kreditvergabe vergleichsweise stärker auf die Produktion wirken als auf Reallöhne und
Beschäftigung. Mit Hilfe einer strukturellen Zeitreihenanalyse von US Daten zum Kredit-
und Arbeitsmarkt ab 1965 kann ich zeigen, dass eine Ausweitung der Kreditvergabe zu
einem Absinken der Lohnquote führt. In diesem Artikel präsentiere ich eine Erklärung
für diesen Zusammenhang die auf dem Kompositionseffekt von Kreditwachstum basiert.
Dabei zeige ich, dass die Transmission von gesamtwirtschaftlichen Schwankungen des
Kreditangebotes auf das Beschäftigungswachstum in jenen Industriezweigen am stärksten
ausgeprägt ist, welche im Vergleich hohe Finanzierungskosten aufweisen. Diese Firmen
bevorzugen besicherungsfähige Kapitalgüter gegenüber Arbeitskräften und zahlen in weit-
erer Folge geringere Löhne. Wenn nun diese Firmen in Folge eines steigenden Kreditange-
bots ihren Anteil an der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Produktion und Beschäftigung erhöhen,
führt diese Kompositionsänderung zu einem Abwärtsdruck auf die aggregierte Lohnquote.
Des Weiteren entwickle ich ein dynamisches Modell welches heterogene Firmen und einen
aggregierten Finanzsektor beinhaltet, und die Interaktion zwischen Finanzmarkt- und
Arbeitsmarktfriktionen abbilden kann. Dieses Modell kann die negativen Kompositions-,
Beschäftigungs- und Lohneffekte bei steigendem gesamtwirtschaftlichen Kreditangebot
erklären. Darüber hinaus bringt es diese negativen Effekte in Einklang mit den gegen-
läufigen, positiven Einzeleffekten auf Firmenebene. Letztere werden in Modellen ohne
Berücksichtigung heterogener Firmencharakteristika erklärt/vorhergesagt. Dieser Artikel
zeigt daher auf, dass eine erleichterte Kreditvergabe möglicherweise kein zielgerichtetes
wirtschaftspolitisches Instrument ist, um Firmen mit hohem Potential zum Beschäfti-
gungsaufbau oder für Lohnsteigerungen zu erreichen.
Zweites Kapitel In diesem Kapitel analysiere ich den dynamischen Einfluss von struk-
turellen Ölmarktschocks auf die Bilanzen von US Firmen anhand von Daten auf dem
Industrielevel, die das verarbeitende Gewerbe, den Handel und den Bergbau umfassen.
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Für Firmen des verarbeitenden Gewerbes zeigen meine Ergebnisse, dass unerwartete Tur-
bulenzen des Ölangebots, die den Ölpreis um 1% erhöhen, die Gewinne dieser Firmen
um 1,3% bei Eintreffen des Schocks senken. Die Gewinne steigen um 0,39% infolge eines
Ölpreisanstiegs gleicher Höhe, wenn dieser durch positive Bewegungen der Weltnachfrage
nach Öl getrieben wird, und um 0,89% nach einem unerwarteten Anstieg der spekulativen
Ölnachfrage. Die positiven Effekte spekulativer Schocks auf die Firmenbilanzen im ver-
arbeitenden Gewerbe stehen im Gegensatz zu deren negativen Effekte auf die weltweite
ökonomische Aktivität. Eine Erklärung hierfür folgt aus der Analyse auf Firmenebene, die
suggeriert, dass Spekulationen auf dem Ölmarkt einen nachgelagerten Effekt bei Zuliefer-
firmen verursachen und die Nachfrage nach Lagerhaltung für Petroleum und Chemiepro-
dukte erhöhen. Im Gegensatz zur sekundären Rolle von Ölangebotsschocks, die darin
besteht historische Variationen im Ölpreis sowie der Gewinne im Handels- und Berg-
bausektor zu erklären, finde ich Evidenz, dass sie die wichtigsten Ölmarktinnovationen
für das Verhalten der Gewinne im verarbeitenden Gewerbe sind. Des Weiteren finde
ich eine gedämpfte Reaktion der Produktionskosten auf exogene Variationen im Ölpreis.
Dies steht im Gegensatz zu klassischen Annahme, dass der Kostenanteil von Öl im In-
dustriesektor deren Anfälligkeit für Ölmarktschocks determiniert.
Drittes Kapitel In vielen Entwicklungsländern sind große Produktivitätslücken über
verschiedene Sektoren hinweg persistent und der strukturelle Transformationsprozess
stagniert. Diese Lücke zwischen beobachteter und optimaler Arbeitsallokation zeigt
institutionelle- sowie Marktfriktionen auf, welche Kosten bei der optimale Allokation
von Arbeit von Niedrig- zu Hochproduktivitätssektoren verursachen. In einem interna-
tionalen Datensatz aus Zeitreihen auf Sektorenlevel schätze ich ein dynamisches Panel-
Fehlerkorrekturmodell, welches die Dynamiken von inter-sektoralen Arbeitsflüssen auf-
fängt. Die Modellschätzung zeigt eine Anzahl neuer stilisierter Fakten zu den die Dy-
namiken des Strukturanpassungsprozesses auf. Es liefert außerdem ein Maß für die Aus-
prägung von Friktionen denen Arbeitsflüsse ausgesetzt sind. Dazu analysiere ich den
Beitrag von Arbeitsmarkregulierung und -reform zur Flussgeschwindigkeit von Arbeit
über Sektoren. Die Ergebnisse suggerieren, dass Politikreformen zwischen dem Ziel der
leichteren Arbeitsplatzschaffung und -zerstörung für Firmen und dem Ziel der Unter-
stützung des inter-sektoralen Arbeitsangebots durch starke soziale Netze, Arbeitsschutz
und Risikoteilung für Arbeitnehmer lenken muss.
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• For equilibrium macroeconomic dynamic modelling: Matlab
• For empirical econometric analysis: R on RStudio
• For faster implementations of both econometric and analytical algorithms: C++
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